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A classic essay on the use of ethnic nationalism and nativism in the decades between Parnell’s death and the Good Friday agreement, this reflection on the Irish use of concepts such as race, nation, and territory in Irish literature and cultural memory (evinced by Thomas Davis, Matthew Arnold, Yeats, and Pearse) remains topical. The sense of an Irish cultural ancestry remains an artistic and intellectual challenge, as it was for Yeats, and as such one can commit to it.
The chapter examines the influential perspective of symbolic interactionism with regard to its defining assumptions, its historical emergence, and its present status, both in the United States and internationally. The discussion covers debates among interactionists regarding theory and methodology, and it also considers intellectual movements strongly influenced by interactionism, especially identity theory, labeling theory, dramaturgy, and constructionism.
Lawrence T. Nichols is a former professor of sociology, recently retired from West Virginia University. He continues to do research and to publish on sociological theory, the construction of social problems, and the history and sociology of social science. Dr. Nichols also edits The American Sociologist, a quarterly journal with an international readership.
‘I wonder if memory is true, and I know that it cannot be, but that one lives by memory nevertheless and not by truth,’ Stravinsky told Robert Craft.1 There are modernist writers – Proust, Nabokov – who see childhood joys as a vital stimulus to art. For Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other hand, it was recollected disgust that shaped the adult self: ‘I loathe my childhood and all that survives of it’.2 Stravinsky’s relations with his early life lay somewhere midway. In Chroniques de ma vie and his late conversations with Robert Craft he underlined the importance of the sound environment in which he grew up and his early exposure to professional music making. Yet he also stressed the emotional, aesthetic and psychological distance between that early world, where the values of his parents and teachers prevailed, and his own adult self. He constantly emphasised, too, his solitude, with just his brother Guri and his German nurse, Bertha Essert, as soulmates in the family apartment on Kryukov Canal, and few companions and friends beyond.
Chapter Two, “Toward the Recreation of a Field of Indexicality: Domestic Violence, Social Meaning, and Ideology,” begins the real analytical work, building a theory of indexicality that can be used to analyze and understand the narrative, interactional work done in storytelling about domestic violence. In Chapter 2, I identify the myriad ideas, concepts, values, and ideologies that circulate in narratives about domestic violence and encounters between police officers and victim/survivors of domestic violence. I argue that the field of indexicality functions like a tapestry made out of stories told about domestic violence and police, while also informing and shaping said tapestry. For example, nearly every participant in the study, police officer and victim/survivor alike, touches on issues of emotional violence, physical violence, staying in and leaving abusive relationships, and policing. In this variety of stories, a great number of values and topics emerge that identify some of the fundamental ideological structures that underpin domestic violence and keep it a culturally viable structure.
In the conclusion, I sum up the arguments of the book by looking in two directions: first, toward language theory and second, toward domestic violence. On the side of language theory, I have made arguments about identity, indexicality and narrative, and then I have correlated them with arguments about staying/leaving narratives, emotional violence, and other facets of domestic violence. The narrative and analytical piece that holds it all together is law enforcement. In this conclusion chapter, I also review and comment on issues such as sexuality and race that I did not deal with in the book, proper.
In the introduction, I review literature on domestic violence, policing, discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and more. This chapter is intended to provide a backdrop for the analysis that is to come. In this chapter, I situate my arguments in the existing scholarship on domestic violence and law enforcement.
This chapter explores the competing memories about the transmission of Sir Thomas More’s hair-shirt – the penitential garment he wore beneath his clothing for most of his adult life – the object’s significance to More’s descendants, and its devotional and memorial function within the religious communities they founded or patronised between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. At the heart of the hair-shirt story are two Margarets: his blood daughter, Margaret Roper (1505–44), and his adopted ward, Margaret Giggs (1508–70). Different historical accounts claim each Margaret as uniquely aware of More’s asceticism, and that they each received the hair-shirt from him when he died. These claims suggest each woman had a superlative connection to More’s spirituality and beliefs. The hair-shirt symbolises More’s deep commitment to God throughout his political career and service to Henry VIII, a commitment that would cost him his life. More’s state execution both literally and figuratively exposed the hair-shirt and his largely private devotional practices. The hair-shirt became a new surface on which memories of the Reformation, and the construction of English Catholic identity have been formed from the sixteenth century to the present day.
This article engages in a theoretical discussion and application of Du Boisian double consciousness to understand the formation of the Muslim American self. Du Boisian double consciousness, and its three elements (the Veil, Twoness, and Second Sight) are used to understand phenomenological processes of Muslim American self-formation as being situated within and conditioned by structural contexts of racialization. By drawing on critical scholarship that highlights the operation of the Muslim racial project in contemporary U.S. contexts, I show how double consciousness emerges through the Othering of Muslim Americans at the macro, meso, and micro levels of society, which then defines them as outside of the U.S. national imaginary, and denies them their equal civic status as citizens of the state. By utilizing double consciousness to understand the Muslim American self as it is embedded in racialized U.S. contexts, this article fills a crucial gap in the literature by theoretically expanding on racialized processes of Muslim American identity formation in the racialized contexts of the United States.
This article revisits and revives the concept of ‘the Stranger’ in theorising international relations by discussing how this figure appears and what role it plays in the politics of (collective) identity. It shows that this concept is central to poststructuralist logic discussing the political production of discourses of danger and to scholarship on ontological security but remains subdued in their analytical narratives. Making the concept of the Stranger explicit is important, we argue, because it directs attention to ambivalence as a source of anxiety and grasps the unsettling experiences that political strategies of conquest or conversion, including practices of securitisation, respond to. Against this backdrop, the article provides a nuanced reading of the Stanger as a form of otherness that captures ambiguity as a threat to modern conceptions of identity, and outlines three scenarios of how it may be encountered in interstate relations: the phenomenon of ‘rising powers’ from the perspective of the hegemon, the dissolution of enmity (overcoming an antagonistic relationship), and the dissolution of friendship (close allies drifting apart). Aware that recovering the concept is not simply an academic exercise but may feed into how the term is used in political discourse and how practitioners deal with ‘strange encounters’, we conclude by pointing to alternative readings of the Stranger/strangeness and the value of doing so.
This paper is concerned with when, if ever, deceptive sex should be criminalised. It defends the idea that it is necessary to distinguish between deceptions that will generally be punishable from those that will not and puts forward a novel framework for carrying out this task. Based on the concept of identity nonrecognition, this framework also offers a new way of understanding what makes certain kinds of deceptive sex wrongful. After setting out this framework, I analyse each of the deceptions that is most often carried out within ‘ordinary’ contexts, explaining why only some of these should generally be punished. The paper concludes by suggesting that identity nonrecognition has the potential to inform criminalisation debates more generally, and that its relevance extends beyond discussions about deceptive sex.
This research note addresses the ongoing debate over the existence of a “Canadian” International Relations (IR) by interrogating the university setting, the professoriate and important institutions of IR in the Canadian context. We not only contribute an update to the data but also enrol a larger number of Canadian universities and a wider sample of journals and conferences. Our analysis is structured around three existing groupings of institutions: the three most “Americanized” departments (the BMT)—University of British Columbia, McGill University and University of Toronto; the four most “critical” departments (the Four Nodes)—McMaster University, University of Ottawa, University of Victoria and York University; and the four largest French-language institutions (the FLIs)—Université de Montréal, Université du Québec à Montréal, Université Laval and Université de Sherbrooke. The characteristic openness often taken to define IR in Canada is more often found at the Four Nodes, the FLIs or unclassified schools than at the BMT schools, which are not only more Americanized in training but also isolated from other Canadian institutions.
Chapter 3 discusses and contrasts Asian varieties of English with the use of English as a lingua franca in Asia. Examples from selected varieties of Asian Englishes are presented. These examples will show how Asian varieties of English are typically code-mixed varieties as speakers use their shared linguistic resources as markers of identity. It must be underlined that the great majority of users of Asian varieties of English have learned English as an additional language and are speakers of other languages. Their variety of English will include linguistic features and items from their speakers’ other languages. These Asian varieties of English are then compared and contrasted with the use of English as a lingua franca in Asia, illustrating, for example, how code-mixing from other languages is reduced, as the primary function of the use of a lingua franca is communication across cultural and linguistic boundaries.
Historians have debated whether Levantines, that is, locally integrated groups with hereditary ties to Western/Central Europe and/or the Catholic Church around the Eastern Mediterranean constituted a proto-ethnic group identity or were merely lumped together by pejorative exonyms. A close reading of Levantine writers' statements or lack thereof reveals that nineteenth-century "Levantine" intellectuals did not lay claim to a group identity, but rather to a space that allowed for ambivalent identities and spaces. Only twentieth-century authors cast Levantine identity as a quasi-ethnicity. The more recent generation has combined the latter assumption with the nostalgia produced by the former.
The polyvalence of late Ottoman port city society, with its many different ethnic and religious communities, overseas and local cultural influences, and the failure of the Ottoman state to provide a convincing common identity for its heterogeneous population combined to make identity building a highly complicated process. Depending on individual stance, locals could find this predicament a possibility to carve out an identity that transgressed against more narrow, community-determined norms. Others however, felt the challenge to develop a personality that met the standards of the coming twentieth century a burden they could not creatively master within the commercial surroundings of the port city. Especially the bourgeois and the ecclesiastical elites of the respective communities, aimed not to negate the possibilities of the age as a whole, but to restrain most forms of individualist and in their eyes morally precarious pursuits, thus restricting the manifold possibilities contemporaries actually had to develop their personality.
During Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, the Russian government and media’s rhetorical embrace of illiberalism, patriotism, and chauvinism was accompanied and partly facilitated by the invocation of historical precedent and “correct” historical understanding. Politicians stressed the importance of a shared historical memory to Russian national identity, rendering the interpretation of history a question of patriotism. The government and state-supportive media then used “patriotic” historical memories to legitimize government policies. Through framing analysis of three significant episodes—namely, the Ukraine Crisis, imposition of sanctions, and Russian intervention in Syria—I outline how the government and state-supportive media conflated these events with supposed historical precedents. This conflation made “patriotic” (or government-approved) history an everyday topic of discussion, but it also confused supporting government policy with celebrating historical triumph (or condemning historical tragedy). In this way, the government co-opted the emotional power of the history they invoked for the purposes of legitimizing their policies. This was compounded by the government and state-supportive media using and citing images and descriptions of ordinary people performing their patriotism in a manner that simultaneously demonstrated awareness of Russian history and support for the government.
This article examines the nexus between art and its ideological function, both discursively and in practice, in the Soviet socialist republics. Scrutinizing the case of visual monumental art in Soviet Tajikistan in the 1970s and 1980s, it can be seen that the geographical and cultural distance from Moscow, in addition to complex multi-actor and multi-level policy implementation channels, allowed for non-conventional artistic practices to develop in the Soviet periphery. The article highlights the role of local officials and, in particular, artists in re-appropriating the official identity formation process with specific ideas of “nationhood,” religion, and gender relations, while at the same time aspiring to comply with the dominant socialist realism doctrine. It is argued that, contrary to the prominent slogan “socialist in content, national in form,” artworks produced in the Soviet periphery were often socialist in form and “national” in content. While the artists skillfully worked within the monumental art tradition promoted by the state, thus relying on a socialist form, not infrequently the meaning of their works distorted, or even contradicted, the official ideology. Often this subversion was non-deliberate. Ultimately, however, the artworks ended up strengthening an autonomous local agency that policy-makers in Moscow sought to eradicate.
What is confusion? And what does confusion have to do with emotion? This chapter argues that Shakespeare’s depictions of confusion elucidate the care with which he ties affective states and bodily conditions together with rational and intellectual processes. Confusion is a state that grips Shakespeare’s characters in their entirety. Deeper still, Shakespeare’s representations of confusion reveal one of the baseline assumptions in his understanding of human emotional life: no affect, passion, or emotion can ever appear on its own, in isolation. In Shakespeare’s view, feeling always involves mixture and mingling – that is, some degree of confusion. Tracing the contours of a philosophical tradition that illuminates the limitations and affordances of confusion, this chapter explores Shakespeare’s depiction of confusion in such plays as Othello, The Merchant of Venice, and Winter’s Tale, but focuses on Cymbeline, a play in which the lived, felt state of confusion takes centre stage.
This chapter discusses the ways in which speech was related to class and gender. It shows that boundaries between public and private were blurred in early modern communities, and that reputation was central to people’s lives. National, regional and local identities receive attention, especially the meaning of ‘Country’, alongside attitudes to foreign communities. Urban neighbourhood receives attention, especially the issue of the extent to which neighbourly values obtained in small districts of towns and cities, and the extent of urban anomie. Dispute settlement is studied, especially informal settlements made within communities. Gender and neighbourhood receives attention, in particular masculine artisanal identities, women’s networks and mutual support, and neighbourly reactions to male domestic violence.
This chapter helps fill a significant gap in the human sciences and professional practice, as theories of life meaning are both few in number and somewhat narrow in scope despite the scientifically and personally compelling nature of the topic. For those focused explicitly on motivating self and others, it opens new horizons for understanding how to elevate human experience under both favorable and adverse circumstances, consistent with the goal of creating a comprehensive theory of motivation and optimal functioning. It does so by explaining not only the nature and antecedents of feelings of life meaning but also that such feelings are facilitated and enhanced by TSP motivational patterns. Life meaning can thus provide humans with the motivational strength needed to overcome major life challenges and obstacles by telling us that “life is worth living” and “these goals are worth pursuing.”
This chapter studies debates over sovereignty between the ‘ulama and the state. It does so by examining the killing of the Pakistani governor Salman Taseer and his alleged act of insulting Muhammad. I assert that in the case of Taseer’s killing, and in blasphemy cases more broadly, the issue of sovereignty boils down to the question of who can deem the insulter worthy of death and execute this punishment. The state, considering itself sovereign, reserves this right for itself. Consequently, it deemed Taseer’s extrajudicial killing a murder and awarded the death penalty to his assassin. The ‘ulama regard God as the ultimate sovereign. They assert that His sovereignty is vested in His law, the shari‘a, which they interpret and articulate. Many ‘ulama maintain that according to the shari‘a, insulting Muhammad is such a grievous crime that anyone can legitimately commit sovereign violence against a Prophet-insulter. Importantly, a minority among the ‘ulama support the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence. These ‘ulama also claim to formulate their arguments from within the shari‘a. In a broader sense, this chapter’s exploration of blasphemy intervenes in the debate of whether an Islamic state – i.e. a polity that demands its own sovereignty, but also emphasizes its reverence for God’s sovereignty – is possible.