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This chapter discusses the methodological and epistemological significance of so-called intuitions in philosophy; that is, whether intuitions can be understood as evidence for or against philosophical claims or, if not, whether they might have some other kind of methodological significance. A closely connected issue which the chapter addresses, is whether our comprehension of logical, conceptual, or metaphysical possibilities and necessities can be explained by reference to intuitions or the capacity of intuition or, if not, how our capacity to understand such modalities should be explained. In response to the accounts of Ernest Sosa and George Bealer, the author distinguishes three senses in which one might talk about intuition or intuitions. On this basis, it is argued that intuitions in the first and second senses cannot do the philosophical work with which Sosa and Bealer task intuitions, whilst the philosophical significance of intuitions in the third sense is radically different from what Sosa and Bealer suggest, namely, consisting not in their evidential status—pace Sosa and Bealer—but in the fact that their scrutiny may reveal something important about how a given philosophical issue has arisen for us, in the first place.
Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I show how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.
This chapter examines the uses of academic approaches to history in discussing energy policy. It sets out a case that the value of history is not simply in the past as a source of empirical data on policy and behaviour (which is accessible to any discipline), but a style of synthetic thinking and evaluation particular to the study of History as a disciplines. History may provide analogue situations for current dilemmas, and a long-term view on change, but does not necessarily work in large-scale or long-term phenomena. Rather, it is the blending of perspectives and the assumption of causal complexity, as opposed to methodological and explanatory parsimony, that marks the value of historical approaches. This is exemplified in the history of prediction, asking not whether predictions were accurate (generally they were not), but why demand for them arose and how they were constructed so as to be plausible to actors.
Political science does not offer a distinct subdiscipline to address the subject of energy. Insofar as political science has addressed energy, it has focused on issues often neglected by other disciplines, notably the role of geopolitics and international relations, and the domestic politics of resource-rich states. Apart from the different subfields, we examine different approaches including realism, constructivism, liberalism and Marxism. The rise and fall and rise again of academic articles on energy in leading political science journals is reviewed and linked to exogenous forces such as the price of oil. Two distinct energy topics which have received attention are nuclear power and the oil crises of 1973–79 because of their wider geopolitical ramifications. Perhaps the most prominent or consistent thread through studies of the politics of energy is the question of energy security or energy independence. Finally, in recent years, energy has increasingly emerged as a focus for study in environmental politics and climate change politics in particular.
This chapter discusses how statistics support scientific practice by providing evidence for new ideas despite natural variation we see between people, systems and contexts. In particular, the frameworks of severe testing and new experimentalism are used to show how experiments can add to knowledge in HCI, even in the absence of strong theories of interaction.
With a view to showing that courts do not have the power to validate native law and custom, this article highlights the different roles assigned to the assent of the people governed by native law and custom, and to the court called upon to determine its judicial enforceability. It argues that customary law is validated by the assent of the people and not by courts, and that the tests contained in different statutes by which courts are permitted to intervene in the regime of customary law are tests of enforceability and not tests of validity. As a result, it argues that the term “validity test” is misleading when used in relation to the power of courts to determine the enforceability of native law and custom, and should therefore be discarded.
This chapter discusses error of fact and error of law as grounds of judicial review. It addresses both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error of fact, as well as the admission of fresh evidence. It then considers error of law and the uncertain approach taken to Anisminic in Hong Kong. It concludes with a consideration of the distinction between error of fact and error of law.
In this two-part feature, Dr Matthew Terrell provides a brief introduction to a new initiative that was launched by Justis in 2017: the inaugural Law and Technology International Writing Competition. This was a competition aimed at attracting students to write a 1,000 word piece in the style of a blog entry. The winner was Róisín Costello from Trinity College Dublin and her article, entitled ‘The Tortoise and the Hare? Due Process and Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in the Digital Age’, follows this introduction.
Choosing an intervention for a patient experiencing distressing symptoms and/or suffering with a mental disorder is part of routine practice for clinicians. While there are now many effective pharmacological and psychological therapies for mental health problems, syndromes and persistent physical symptoms (e.g. chronic pain), choosing the ‘right’ therapy can sometimes be a challenge. This can certainly be the case when it comes to psychological therapies. There are many different approaches to choose from and many have not been subjected to rigorous study.
In this article, we aim to help inform and guide the busy clinician in choosing a psychological therapy for their patient. We give a brief overview of the major psychotherapy modalities and consider which guidelines to refer to and which psychological therapies have been found to be most effective for the presenting problem(s) seen in clinic. Lastly, we discuss the limitations of the current guidelines in relation to comorbid presentations and consider how this can be best addressed.
•Develop knowledge regarding the major psychotherapy approaches
•Be aware that there is no psychotherapy equivalence
•Learn that there is good evidence that some approaches are more effective than others for specific problems and be better able to choose a psychological therapy
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
D. McC. works on research trials funded by the Guy's and St Thomas’ Charity. T. C. receives salary support from the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Mental Health Biomedical Research Centre at South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and King's College London, and receives several grants for evaluating the efficacy of different cognitive–behavioural approaches. This article received no specific grant from any funding agency, or from the commercial or not-for-profit sectors. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the NHS.