To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 8 reflects on findings from the preceding chapters, concluding that parental migration profoundly changed children’s relationships with the adults in their families. The children were socialised to see their parents’ migration as generating an intergenerational debt for them to repay through study. Simultaneously, children’s perceptions of their families’ care for them were influenced by (1) a future-oriented striving ethos that valorised youth and cities over elders and rurality, and (2) social constructions of motherhood and fatherhood that shaped ideas about the kinds of care and investment necessary to prepare children for decent urban futures. In drawing on the cultural repertoires that people took for granted, striving struck at the heart of the rural family such that pathways to ‘recognition’ within and beyond the family cohered: failure at school or in the labour market was failure as a child, parent, or spouse. This chapter questions the inevitability of ceaseless multi-local family striving. Children, with their natural emphasis on reciprocity highlight the basic human need for social protection, intimacy, interdependence, affective wellbeing and shared time. China’s-policy makers see further urbanisation as the answer to the problem of left-behind children. But can their development plans ever heed a child-inspired ethic of care?
The prohibition on using others ‘merely as means’ is one of the best-known and most influential elements of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. But it is widely regarded as impossible to specify with precision the conditions under which this prohibition is violated. On the basis of a re-examination of Kant’s texts, the article develops a novel account of the conditions for using someone ‘merely as a means’. It is argued that this account has not only strong textual support but also significant philosophical advantages over alternative conceptions.
Many people argue that we should practice conscientious consumption. Faced with goods from gravely flawed production processes, such as wood from clear-cut rainforests or electronics containing conflict minerals, they argue that we should enact personal policies to routinely shun tainted goods and select pure(r) goods. However, consumers typically should be relatively uncertain about which flaws in global supply chains are grave and the connection of purchases to those grave flaws. The threat of significant uncertainty makes conscientious consumption appear to be no better, or even worse, than an overlooked option. This overlooked option is consumption with relinquishment: disregarding each product’s possible connections with upstream grave flaws and using the time, money, and energy saved in this way to address grave flaws directly.
Recent scholarship in philosophy of science and technology has shown that scientific and technological decision making are laden with values, including values of a social, political, and/or ethical character. This paper examines the role of value judgments in the design of machine-learning (ML) systems generally and in recidivism-prediction algorithms specifically. Drawing on work on inductive and epistemic risk, the paper argues that ML systems are value laden in ways similar to human decision making, because the development and design of ML systems requires human decisions that involve tradeoffs that reflect values. In many cases, these decisions have significant—and, in some cases, disparate—downstream impacts on human lives. After examining an influential court decision regarding the use of proprietary recidivism-prediction algorithms in criminal sentencing, Wisconsin v. Loomis, the paper provides three recommendations for the use of ML in penal systems.
To be considered good, a program needs to do what it is supposed to do. The next most important property is that it should be clearly understandable by a human reader, because that is necessary when you want to improve it in any way. More controversial is the question of whether a good program must be concise. As a student you will naturally want to get high marks. Finally, anyone who writes programs needs to be aware of ethics.
The Royal College of Psychiatrists’ continuing professional development (CPD) module on clinical ethics in psychiatry by Pearce & Tan describes some common ethical dilemmas in psychiatric practice and the work of clinical ethics committees in analysing these dilemmas. In this article we build upon their work and offer additional exploration of the nature of ethical dilemmas in psychiatry. We also build upon the models of reasoning that are described in the module and suggest ways for psychiatrists to think about ethical dilemmas when a clinical ethics committee is not available.
In the past decade there has been a rapid increase in gender diversity, particularly in children and young people, with referrals to specialist gender clinics rising. In this article, the evolving terminology around transgender health is considered and the role of psychiatry is explored now that this condition is no longer classified as a mental illness. The concept of conversion therapy with reference to alternative gender identities is examined critically and with reference to psychiatry's historical relationship with conversion therapy for homosexuality. The authors consider the uncertainties that clinicians face when dealing with something that is no longer a disorder nor a mental condition and yet for which medical interventions are frequently sought and in which mental health comorbidities are common.
In this article, I confront Parfit’s Mixed Maxims Objection. I argue that recent attempts to respond to this objection fail, and I argue that their failure is compounded by the failure of recent attempts to show how the Formula of Universal Law can be used to demarcate the category of obligatory maxims. I then set out my own response to the objection, drawing on remarks from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals for inspiration and developing a novel account of how the Formula of Universal Law can be employed to determine the deontic status of action tokens, action types and maxims.
Chapter 7 locates the ethical dimension of education within the students’ lived experiences in schools. It maintains that ethical education is concerned with providing relevant, intended and continuous direct experiences to enable young people to grow with a sense of respect and empathy for others and to engage, think and act ethically. It considers what changes in educational institutions would be essential in helping students to become more ethically aware, sensitive and motivated. These include engaging in peer and adult relationships characterised by care and reflection; and encounters with ethical issues and the relating topics of justice, fairness and equality. Reflecting on such practices in a variety of educational contexts such as in Ghana, Swaziland and Kenya, this chapter proposes a number of steps and practices towards ethical education in schools, including mapping out relational and ethical spaces in schools, integrating the ethos of building schools as ethical communities, consolidating curriculum activities and so forth. Examples can teach us principles to base our educative practices upon. It concludes that in doing so, students and teachers will not only learn about relationships but more importantly they will learn in relationship.
This article concentrates on manifestations of medieval political philosophy in the Rose. It focuses on two crucial themes for understanding the foundations of political and social life: the origins of political community, private property and other social institutions; and the relationship between love and justice, and the political relevance of these two concepts. The article first discusses Jean de Meun’s view concerning the origins of social institutions, and relates it to Ciceronian and Augustinian traditions, which had a deep influence on medieval political philosophy. The main focus of the article is on the relation between Jean’s political ideas and medieval understanding of Aristotle’s political philosophy and moral psychology. It is argued that the political role of love and justice cannot be understood without taking medieval Aristotelian philosophy seriously. Instead of trying to find historical and textual connections between individual medieval philosophers and Jean’s poem, the article embraces a different methodological approach: it aims to understand the philosophy behind the poem. This aim is achieved by reading relevant passages against medieval adaptations of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. The article thus charts possible connections between scholasticism and the Rose and aims to show that they should be understood against thirteenth-century Aristotelian philosophy.
Chapter 6 considers a conception of the self that is especially conducive, if not essential, to becoming aware of and sensitive to one’s obligation to care for others. It argues that awareness of and sensitivity to the ethical imperative of caring for others requires the confirmation of an enriched version of oneself grounded in a personal sense of moral agency. This sense of agency entails the realisation that, within reasonable limits, one is free to choose a life path, understand the consequences of the path one has chosen, and adjust it as one sees fit. Such a deepened sense of self (and self-responsibility) is necessary in order to receive and attend to the needs and feelings of others. To pursue ethical education conceived in this way, both faith-based and common schools of those societies that initiate into particular traditions and those that educate believers and non-believers from a diversity of worldviews ought to nurture moral agency. Pedagogies of the sacred, which initiate students into intelligent spiritualties that give expression to particular identities, and pedagogies of difference, which teach and learn from and about a variety of worldviews, embody educational processes critical to that end.
The Introduction challenges three limited approaches to ethical education, that is, the teaching of moral values as a subject matter, as the fostering of cognitive moral reasoning, or as the cultivation of virtues or character traits. We argue that ethics does not consist solely in informational propositional knowledge, but instead, it requires cultivating sensitivities that constitute caring in a relationship; ethics is rooted more deeply in the social and emotional aspects of human relationships than in the cognitive reasoning of moral principles, which will not awaken the need nor enliven the ability to appreciate the differences in others; ethics cannot be reduced to a list of virtues. We further argue that these three approaches are limited not only in their capacity to enable young people to overcome challenges in relationships with and feeling for others, but also in these being situated within an instrumentalised conception of education. This conception tends to ignore the importance of living human relationships within a school community as intrinsically valuable, hence missing out a core ingredient in ethics. To overcome these limitations, this book proposes that ethics should be understood primarily in terms of engaging with others in human relationships that consist in caring and mutual appreciation.
Chapter 1 starts with a challenge that we seem to approach the current conditions of the world in which there is a simultaneously receding interest in issues of The Good, and an intensification in commitments to The Good. To move beyond the impasse of what could be characterised as a thoughtless relativism and a suffocating foundationalism, the author outlines the rationale for relational ethics. In this case, the ultimate value is placed on the nourishment of relational processes, the original source of moral value. However, in the contemporary world of conflicting traditions, recognition, awareness, and talents are required for encouraging and sustaining this process. Herein lies the major challenge for education. Sweeping reform may not meet this demand, as ethically consequential education can and should be integrated into the daily practices of school life. The chapter concludes that educational ethos, curriculum design, pedagogies, and evaluative practices are not simply techniques of knowledge transmission. When ethically informed, they hold the potential for life-giving transformation of global communities.
This chapter considers how it might make sense to think of the allegorical fiction as philosophical. The unsettling figure at the heart of the Roman de la Rose Faux Semblant is a walking sophism, embodying the paradox sometimes known as the Cretan Liar’s paradox: he tells us that he is lying and that nothing that he says can be trusted. In a sense he represents an extreme case of the problem of all literary endeavours that claim to offer truth through falsehood. In his sermon on hypocrisy, Faux Sembant explicitly names Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis, implying a connection between the Rose’s hermeneutic problems and those considered as part of dialectical training in medieval schools. This chapter reads the Rose against the tradition of the De sophisticis and sophismata-literature to show the poem itself as offering an education in sophistry, taken in a broader sense than its use in language arts. Sophism and sophistry are used figuratively throughout the Rose to refer to hypocrisy and falseness of all kinds, including literary falseness. Rooted in the intellectual culture of the university, the Rose considers the value of lying and the benefits of reading a work that rarely means what it says.
Chapter 2 argues that relationships are integral to a person’s life and constituted in human’s well-being. As both human life and well-being have non-instrumental values, relationships cannot be instrumentalised. Thus in our relationships with others, we connect to the intrinsic value of them as persons. Insofar as we appreciate other people as such, that value and other people become part of our own life. In this way, human relationships can enlarge our horizons and enrich our lives. These interpersonal relationships are ethical because they involve a form of caring. An awareness of ethical relationships in one’s well-being can determine an openness and attentiveness to others. In this sense, others must be regarded as whole beings, not as assemblage of their identity labels or roles. This commitment to being-with and to ‘we’-ness is transformative and transcendent, and such ethical relationships can be nurtured through caring education and radical love. This includes learning to be directed at cultivating human qualities; curriculum to offer unmediated experiences of others through humanities subjects and activities within the humanities domains; and pedagogy to feature listening and dialogue. Most importantly, schools should be set up as caring communities where members can collaborate and develop a sense of ‘we’.
This first, introductory chapter explains that the purpose of the book is to detail how international humanitarian law addresses development of autonomous weapon systems. IHL seeks to maintain a balance between competing concerns: primarily, the necessity for States to protect their national interests through military means when peace fails and their obligation to serve broader humanitarian goals by limiting the harm inflicted on those involved in armed conflict. Accordingly, the law must be revised and updated as the technology of war changes. The book discusses the ways in which law must respond to use of autonomous weapon systems in order to maintain the balance. The remainder of the chapter sets the scope of the discussion: the book does not advocate for or against autonomous weapons, only assesses their compatibility with existing IHL; it does not focus on any specific weapon system, but on autonomy as a capability; and the legal frame of reference is the First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The final chapter first summarizes the main arguments made in the book, overviewing the hypotheses developed and evidence used to test them in the empirical chapters. The conclusion also addresses the question of external validity by drawing in examples of similar phenomena from other countries around the world, both developing and developed, that are experiencing significant interest in political office from businesspeople. The book paints a somewhat grim picture of the effects of businesspeople winning elected office. In this chapter, I lastly examine whether there are policy solutions that might deter those businesspeople looking to abuse their positions in their private interests from running. I close by offering a number of recommendations that emerge from the analysis, both including and going beyond ethics laws, that could be of use in containing rent-seeking by these individuals in power.
When setting priorities for health, there is broad agreement that a range of social values and ethical principles beyond clinical and cost-effectiveness matter, but exactly how health technology assessment (HTA) should account for a broader set of criteria remains an area of ongoing debate. In light of this, we welcome a recent review paper by Baltussen et al. evaluating the potential of different multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approaches to enable HTA agencies to incorporate a broader set of values in their appraisals. The authors describe three approaches to MCDA—qualitative MCDA, quantitative MCDA, and MCDA with decision rules—laying out their relative advantages and disadvantages and providing recommendations for how they can best be implemented. While we endorse many of the authors' assessments and conclusions, including the critical role of deliberation in any MCDA approach and the undertaking of qualitative MCDA at a minimum, we take a stronger position regarding the flaws of quantitative MCDA and strongly caution against it. We find quantitative MCDA antithetical to at least two of the ways MCDA is intended to improve HTA recommendations: (i) enhancing quality and (ii) promoting transparency. Quantitative MCDA may mask the complex tradeoffs that exist within and between decision criteria and remain generally inaccessible to those who are not well-versed in its technical methods of appraisal. We advocate for a predominantly qualitative approach to MCDA appraisal centered around deliberation and supplemented with decision aids to help account for health opportunity costs.
This article examines the concept of the “true hunter” (vrai chasseur) among big game hunters in French colonial Indochina. Drawing primarily on French language texts published by highly experienced European hunters between 1910 and 1950, it first examines in detail the true hunter ethic, which required hunters to hunt and kill their prey in a “sporting” (sportif) manner. This ethic involved adherence to an expansive and complicated set of rules related to stalking, marksmanship, knowledge possession, restraint, prey selection, choice of firearms and ammunition, and others. True hunting was regarded as by definition difficult and, as is argued, the practical realization of the true hunter ideal entailed not simply engaging in hunting as an activity, but instead successfully performing a very difficult but specific type of killing. The article's second purpose is to engage a paradox associated with the texts, their authors, and the ethic. While critical of other hunters for “unnecessary slaughter,” many killed staggering numbers of animals. This paradox is accounted for by placing the true hunters in the broader social context of colonial Indochina. Both their type of sport hunting and the virtuosity of their killing distinguished them from the indigenous populations that served their hunts and other European hunters. This virtuosity also legitimized the scale of their killing and placed these hunters into a distinctive social and moral community.
In her new memoir, The Education of an Idealist, Samantha Power reflects on her eight years in the Obama administration. Although she claims that the experience did little to change her views, there is a considerable disjuncture between her point of view in her award-winning earlier book “A Problem from Hell,” in which she criticizes U.S. officials for not doing the right thing, and her point of view in The Education of an Idealist, in which she defends indifference of U.S. officials under somewhat similar circumstances during the Obama years. The author of Problem could not have written Education, and the author of Education could not have written Problem. What does this tell us about the possibility for ethics in foreign policy?