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In this chapter, I highlight the historical prevalence of sovereign default as a potentially devastating form of economic crisis. I also identify that, despite the decision to default being held by politicians or politically-appointed actors, our understanding of the political dynamics surrounding default is limited. I conclude by summarizing my regime-contingent argument on the political economy of default.
Is darker skin pigmentation associated with less favorable social and political outcomes in Latin America? We leverage data from 18 Latin American countries across multiple survey waves to demonstrate the robust and potent negative relationship between the darkness of skin tone and socio-economic status. Then we examine the relationship between skin color and attitudes toward the political system. In spite of our substantial sample size, we find little support for the expectation that respondents with darker skin are less favorably disposed toward the political system—indeed, on balance, our findings run counter to this expectation. Our findings suggest that the socio-economic “pigmentocracy” that pervades the region does not necessarily translate into pronounced differences in attitudes about the political system. This finding casts some doubt on the expectation that social inequalities are likely to destabilize governments or undermine their legitimacy.
The term ‘Westminster model’, widely used in both the academic and practitioner literatures, is a familiar one. But detailed examination finds significant confusion about its meaning. This article follows Giovanni Sartori's advice for ‘reconstructing’ a social science term whose meaning may be unclear through review of its use in the recent literature. It finds that many authors in comparative politics use the term ‘Westminster model’ without definition, while those providing definitions associate it with a large (and sometimes conflicting) set of attributes, and a set of countries often not demonstrating those attributes. Some have sought to respect this diversity by proposing variants like ‘Washminster’ or ‘Eastminster’, while others suggest that the term should be seen as a loose ‘family resemblance’ concept. But on examination it no longer meets even the – relatively weak – requirements for family resemblance. To end the muddle, and the risk of flawed inferences and false generalization, comparative scholars should drop this term, and select cases based on more precise attributes instead.
Surging flows of international migrants challenge the state's capacity to control borders. This problem is especially acute when it involves unwanted, yet often the most vulnerable, incomers. In liberal democracies, policymakers are caught in the dilemma of how to block their presence without contravening the state's fundamental liberal principles. Against the backdrop of these realities, this article traces the development of monetized means of inducing the voluntary repatriation of such migrants. In contrast to the conventional view that associates this political phenomenon with the neoliberal marketization of belonging, I contend that the growing practice of incentivizing migrants to leave is better conceptualized as a subset of immigration control policies rooted in the liberal ideals that imbue the institutional orders of liberal democracies. From the state's perspective, such post-arrival measures pay greater attention to the individual rights of migrants. This argument is advanced with special reference to the underexplored case of Japan.
The logic of democratic power is put to an empirical test in Chapter 6. Having identified treaties as the best observable source of international rules, this chapter tests the democratic power argument for international rule–based cooperation systematically in the context of international treaty making, which involves three stages – negotiations, commitment, and compliance. This statistical analysis is based on a dataset of seventy–five international treaties adopted between 1945 and 2008 and is complemented with insights from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The results reveal consistent and robust empirical patterns regarding states’ willingness and ability to cooperate over international treaties, which are generalizable across treaties, issues, and the stages of treaty making. The analysis confirms the centrality of the democratic powers as the chief promoters and adherents of international rules that gradually but inadvertently contribute to the constitutionalization of world politics.
Moving from the grand and abstract theme of international constitutionalization to the more tangible and observable process of international rule making, Chapter 5 analyzes states’ motives for cooperating over international rules that form the unintended basis of international constitutionalization. It lays out the logic of democratic power, according to which states that are both democratic and powerful (democratic powers) combine the willingness and ability to promote international rules. Because democracies are rule–based, they understand the value of operating through rules and doing so is consistent with their domestic operations. Insofar as they are also powerful, democracies are able to advance their rule–based approach at the international level to shape rules according to their interests and values, which makes it easier for them to commit to and follow those rules. Democratic powers are thus decisive for international rule–based cooperation. States that lack either one or both of these prerequisites are less supportive of institutionalized cooperation and thus constitutionalization in world politics.
The goal of this chapter is to connect the existing prohibitions on foreign participation in elections, that is, to demonstrate that the familiar regulations – prohibitions on foreign voting and spending, as well as registration statutes – should be viewed as methods to protect the collective entity’s exercise of its right of self-determination. Then, once these regulations are understood in this light, a conceptual space opens up to ask whether additional boundary regulations might be enacted in order to secure electoral integrity in the face of foreign election interference. Specifically, this chapter will discuss transparency regimes that might help identify electioneering that originates from foreign sources. The existing regulations target non-citizen voting and foreign spending, but as the Special Counsel indictment against the IRA demonstrated, it is often hard to enforce these regulations against foreign actors located outside the United States. For this reason, it is important to consider other methods of signaling to the public that election speech, such as social media posts, have originated from outside the polity.
Chapter 6 considers a conception of the self that is especially conducive, if not essential, to becoming aware of and sensitive to one’s obligation to care for others. It argues that awareness of and sensitivity to the ethical imperative of caring for others requires the confirmation of an enriched version of oneself grounded in a personal sense of moral agency. This sense of agency entails the realisation that, within reasonable limits, one is free to choose a life path, understand the consequences of the path one has chosen, and adjust it as one sees fit. Such a deepened sense of self (and self-responsibility) is necessary in order to receive and attend to the needs and feelings of others. To pursue ethical education conceived in this way, both faith-based and common schools of those societies that initiate into particular traditions and those that educate believers and non-believers from a diversity of worldviews ought to nurture moral agency. Pedagogies of the sacred, which initiate students into intelligent spiritualties that give expression to particular identities, and pedagogies of difference, which teach and learn from and about a variety of worldviews, embody educational processes critical to that end.
Although election interference is not new, Russia’s social media strategy for election interference in the 2016 election represented a new form of interference in the political affairs of the United States. The advent of social media electioneering raised a number of important political questions. While political commentators were debating these questions, international lawyers were engaged in a parallel conversation, one that was more technical but just as consequential: Did Russia’s interference violate international law? Did Russia do something wrong by operating a troll farm to promote divisive rhetoric in the American political landscape? Did the use of cyber technologies turn the Russian interference into an illegal cyber-attack that triggered a right of response, a form of cyber self-defense? International lawyers generally fell into two camps, with one camp viewing the interference as illegal and another camp viewing it as regrettable but probably lawful under existing legal frameworks. But everyone agreed that Russia’s aggressive use of social media technology was a game-changer. This book argues that the “illegal” camp had it right – Russia did violate international law – but that the “illegal camp” had the wrong reasons for reaching this conclusion.
This chapter examines Hong Kong perspectives on the rule of law and argues that concern with maintaining the rule of law has been at the heart of the battle over political reform. In these political clashes a rather hardline Beijing approach to rule by law is juxtaposed against the very liberal Hong Kong perspective developed under British rule. As deLisle points out in and Cullen and Campbell elaborate on, there is a wide gap between Hong Kong and Beijing on the rule of law. With Beijing’s perceived lack of the rule of law, Hong Kongers have generally viewed the promised high degree of autonomy and noninterference by the central government as crucial to maintaining the rule of law and avoiding arbitrary rule in Hong Kong’s separate system. Such hands-off approach was clearly understood in formulating the “one country, two systems” model for Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, though application has fallen short. Starting with the historical commitments, this chapter critically examines the series of official reports and decisions surrounding the 2014 clashes over political reform in Hong Kong and considers their relevance to the rule-of-law debate.
On the solely jurisdictional reading, the nonestablishment clause in the US Constitution's First Amendment was designed to confirm that power over politics in relation to religion was assigned solely to the several states. This article first summarizes two presentations of that view (those of Steven D. Smith and Akhil Reed Amar), offers a critique of it, and then outlines an alternative. The critique is theoretical, seeking to show the incoherence of the solely jurisdictional reading, such that any theorist who assumes its internal consistency cancels her or his own interpretation of the First Amendment. This incoherence is present because that reading assumes the suprarational character of religious or comprehensive convictions, even while those citizens who hold any such conviction believe that justice depends on the ultimate terms of political evaluation they affirm. On the alternative outlined, religious freedom makes sense if and only if the ultimate terms of evaluation are given in common (adult) human experience, and thus the question about them is itself rational.
This concluding chapter draws together the strands of argument in the book by surveying the political thought of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. The chapter then examines why the 2014 case for independence had changed in significant respects from the earlier versions of the case examined in this book. Finally, the chapter weighs up the changes that will be needed to the case for Scottish independence as nationalists look towards another referendum.
This chapter works out what seems to be a paradox: secession, a process of splitting and division of Member States can lead to strengthening solidarity. The research question is whether a claim of secession contravenes per se the founding European value of solidarity enshrined in Article 2 (TEU). After a brief introduction, the chapter analyses the concept of secession, its meanings, effects and moral implications of a process of withdrawing from a EU Member State. It follows by analysing the concept of solidarity and its EU legal-politico perspectives. It finally concludes by presenting an alternative vision to the dominant presumption that considers that self-determination from a democratic state implies necessarily an egoist economic and political reason.
The author understands solidarity primarily as a legal concept of co-operative projects of forming an ever further expanded democratic legal community (Rechtsgenossenschaft). Solidarity is complementary to justice, and principle of democracy that is self-legislated includes both sides. Self-legislation, solidarity and justice are equally universal concepts. The first section of the chapter is a brief diagnosis of modern society under conditions of global crisis. Democratic solidarity must stand up to two crucial experimental checks, one is normative and the other factual. The second section of the chapter draws some political conclusions related to the most fundamental problems of the present world society. The final section tries to specify four changes political agencies need to adopt to save democratic solidarities under stress from globalisation.
Scottish nationalism understood as support for an independent Scottish state is notable by its absence from most of Scotland’s history after 1707. Although the initial organised advocacy for greater Scottish democratic autonomy within the United Kingdom emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the goal of Scottish independence only received its first sustained modern articulation after the First World War. This chapter examines the ideology of these early Scottish nationalists as they tried to construct a persuasive case for independence before the rise in support for the SNP in the 1960s. The aim of the chapter is not to offer an exhaustive account of the nationalism of this period but to set the scene for the rest of the book by clarifying the ideological resources that were already available for advocates of independence in the mid-twentieth century. The chapter looks in turn at the political economy and constitutionalist arguments that were framed by nationalists in the decades around the Second World War.
This chapter examines the cultural case for Scottish independence made from the 1960s onwards, understood in a broad sense as the view that the Union threatens the autonomy of Scotland’s distinctive institutions, particularly its egalitarian character as expressed through its democratic intellectual and educational traditions. The chapter focuses on the influential argument along these lines articulated by the philosopher George Davie and a number of cultural nationalists influenced by him. Although widely discussed, this cultural nationalism was considered to be a false start by many influential figures in the independence movement. The chapter concludes by reviewing why many leading advocates of independence instead looked to alternative intellectual sources, or translated the cultural case into a political one, to advance their cause.
The article claims that the type of postnational democracy envisaged by its most outspoken advocates amounts to pouring new wine into old bottles. In order to be sufficiently lively and socially significant, such a postnational democracy would have to draw precisely on the type of cultural resources that also feed into national solidarity. In this understanding, a postnational democracy would be different from national democracy only in name.
This chapter turns to the nationalist critique of the British state from the 1960s. It demonstrates how indebted independence supporters have been to the writings of Tom Nairn and the wider New Left’s characterisation of Britain as an antediluvian relic that historically evaded an adequate process of modernisation. In particular, the chapter demonstrates the importance of ‘imperialism’ to nationalist thinking, insofar as nationalists saw the fundamental weakness of British national identity as its close connection with empire and the economic ‘decline’ of the British state as related to its loss of colonial possessions. However, the chapter also documents the fading away of the Marxist and economistic elements of this critique of Britain over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, to be replaced by a robust, but avowedly political, democratic republicanism, which identified the British state’s chief shortcoming as a failure to become a proper bourgeois democracy.
This chapter focuses on the concept of sovereignty and the twofold role it has played in nationalist thought. First, the chapter shows that an increasingly important argument for independence has been that a long-standing Scottish tradition of popular sovereignty is fundamentally in tension with the English notion of parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, a rudimentary but highly effective argument for Scottish independence from the 1980s onwards was simply that in the absence of a Scottish state Scotland is often governed from Westminster by a party that the Scottish people did not vote for. On this account, Scottish independence is supported by the principles of democracy. But, second, the chapter also demonstrates that from the 1980s onwards Scottish nationalists frequently argued that the era of absolute state sovereignty had ended. Instead, an independent Scotland would be one among a whole raft of ‘post-sovereign’ European states, sharing membership of the European Union and pooling sovereignty where appropriate to advance their interests.
This concluding chapter situates the arguments made in this book within ongoing debates about the nature of hierarchy and equality in international relations. It then turns to reflect on the implications of the closure thesis in light of contemporary developments that seem to point to an opening of the system forced by the diffusion of power away from the West or away from the nation-state. It identifies in the closure thesis one explanation for why we are witnessing institutional fragmentation instead of institutional reform in response to the global power shift. Finally, the chapter considers possible future transformations and the potential for creating more egalitarian global relations.