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This chapter discusses the ways in which States and IOs need to continue engaging with the treaty throughout its life. It illustrates continuing engagement at the domestic or internal level and on the international plane, and how these processes interact with each other. It focuses on issues arising from engagement with treaty institutions such as Conference of Parties, reporting requirements in treaties, the role of treaty secretariats and compliance mechanisms. It also looks at continuing engagement with treaty acts, in particular the handling of amendments, reservations and declarations by other parties, and interpretation and application of treaties by domestic courts.
This chapter analyses the proposals to improve the governance of responsibility at the state level through civil liability and tort law and criminal law approaches as well as at the supranational level through human rights treaty bodies as well as proposals for international courts such as the World Court of Human Rights and the World Court of Business and Human Rights and international arbitration. The chapter concludes with insights on what child-friendly governance of responsibility means.
A case-study approach of two Irish cases in the mid-1850s drew popular attention to the vulnerability of women under the existing gendered law of divorce and the need for its reform. The 1856 divorce of John Talbot of Co. Roscommon and Mary Anne (néeMacCausland) of Co. Londonderry was highly publicised. The case also raised popular criticism of Talbot for conspiring to be rid of his wife, the ecclesiastical courts and parliamentary divorce. The case coincided with a lunacy panic regarding the incarceration of sane women in asylums; however, in the Talbot case, Mary Anne never regained her sanity after being detained and subjected to a physical and likely sexual attack to allow her spouse to divorce her on the grounds of adultery. This divorce attracted considerable legal attention and prompted calls for divorce to be removed from the parliamentary arena. The Westmeaths, even after decades of litigation, never secured a divorce. A re-reading of Emily, Marchioness of Westmeath, is presented here to restore her to the historical narrative as a divorce law reformer and challenge Stone’s earlier sexist portrayal of her as petty, vindictive and obsessed with women’s rights.
Although the sexual double standard endured in the divorce court, parliamentary divorce remained lengthier, costlier and more socially and gender-biased. This chapter examines the profile of Irish parliamentary divorce petitioners and legal critics of the system. Successive attempts to reform Irish divorce provision failed. The personal trials that the lack of legislative uniformity in the UK caused was underscored by the Yelverton case which invoked Scottish, Irish and English law and partially inspired a royal commission to consider extending the jurisdiction of the divorce court in 1861. The commission recommended the unification of divorce provision throughout the UK, but this was never implemented. A further royal commission considered the laws of marriage from 1865 and recommended that divorce laws should be unified throughout the UK, but like the earlier calls for Irish divorce reform, this was never enacted: Ireland remained legislatively stranded. The O’Shea divorce in 1891, citing Irish nationalist leader Parnell as co-respondent, also drew the association between morality and divorce ever tighter and the full force of moral Catholicism was unleashed for the first time.
This chapter explores divorce law reform in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland government liaised with Westminster regarding the removal of divorce from parliament’s jurisdiction from 1931; however, Westminster’s passage of Herbert’s bill along with the reform which in 1937 added desertion of three years’ duration; presumption of a spouse’s death; cruelty, although still legislatively undefined; and incurable insanity as sole grounds for divorce revived the debate in regard to equity of divorce provison throughout the UK. Debates concerning the Matrimonial Causes Act (NI) of 1939 are explored alongside the impact of the reform which transferred divorce jurisdiction to the Northern Ireland High Court, reformed the grounds for divorce along English lines and ended the faltering criminal conversation action, replacing it with a statutory action for damages. The subsequent rise in divorce rates in Northern Ireland and later divore law reforms are explored as well as the continuing moral conservatism bolstering cross-party oppoition to ‘easy’ divorce.
Despite the retention of the parliamentary system of divorce for Irish petitioners, divorce law was not static as the changing definition of marital cruelty and precedent established in the divorce court facilitated more Irish parliamentary divorces, especially from female petitioners. The legal definition of marital cruelty evolved from the late 18th century to embrace non-physical violence, the threat of violence and the abuse of children in front of a mother with intent to cause distress. These legal changes were indicative of transformative social mores concerning men’s role in marriage and the marital union more generally. The Irish body of case law pertaining to this shifting definition is explored in addition to the parliamentary divorce of Louisa Westropp, the first Irish woman to divorce whose case established legal precedent in allowing grounds for divorce recognised in the divorce court to be applied to parliament. Contemporaneous reforms in custody rights also impacted and therefore, by the early 20th century, female Irish petitioners were in the majority in bringing divorce bills to Westminster.
Those of Irish domicile or lacking a permanent home in England or Wales were barred from the divorce court, but parliamentary divorce’s noxious reputation encouraged some Irish petitioners to develop means to circumvent its expense and publicity. Various strategies such as renting a house and paying rates in England were deployed to access the divorce court. This chapter samples Irish petitioners who divorced in court both legally and surreptitiously. A covert court divorce could invalidate second marriages, bastardise issue and contest marriage settlements. The late-nineteenth-century court-based divorces of domiciled Irishmen Colonel Sinclair and Colonel Malone were the most widely publicised of these cases. The legitimacy of their divorces was questioned, and problems arose regarding marriage settlements. The court was therefore increasingly rigorous about testing domicile; a rule that all divorce court petitioners would have to swear English domicile and falsification would bar the proceedings was introduced. However, although domicile was more stringently tested, Irish cases were presented to the divorce court with an increased regularity in the early twentieth century.
In this chapter I provide a sketch of rhetorical performance practice as it emerges from the rich, complex, and contradictory texts of the Greco-Roman world. A visual conception of ancient rhetoric: John Bulwer’s representation of rhetorical stage acting, which contrasts the stage actor with the dialectician. Greece and Rome: Greece developed the art of rhetoric, accepting the centrality of acting or ‘hypokrisis’, while Roman orators placed more emphasis on the constant persona of the orator. Cicero and Roscius: a case study of how Cicero used performance skills to defend the celebrity stage actor in court. Cicero’s ‘De Oratore’: Cicero’s masterpiece, couched as a dialogue to make it clear there is no single set of rules for being an orator. Quintilian: who codified Cicero, and made rhetoric the foundation of an educational programme. Tacitus: who dissented from Quintilian’s political conformism. Augustine: who tried to adapt his rhetorical training to serve the needs of Christian preaching, anticipating the dilemmas faced by rhetorical performers in the Renaissance.
This chapter explores the rationale for and impact of Ireland’s exclusion from the 1857 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act which moved English (and Welsh) divorce from parliament to court. The lack of engagement with this reform was apparent across the religious divides in Ireland which allows the suggestion of Catholic orthodoxy emerging as victorious against a liberal reform to be challenged. The Irish Catholic and Protestant presses opposed the bill more forcibly than any of the churches which evidences that Irish resistance to divorce was not always denominationally bound. However, akin to the Irish church response to divorce reform, the press never encouraged more popular protest. That Ireland was seen as a case apart in regard to divorce reform is highlighted by the government’s encouragement of other areas of the empire to apply the rulings of the 1857 divorce act. In consequence, by 1869 only Irish divorce bills were routinely heard in Westminster which remained averse to introducing divorce reform for Ireland. This inertia continued for decades as successive administrations proved disinclined to extend the 1857 act to Ireland and few called for its application.
The focus of Chapter 3 is Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh’s Ma’sumeh Shirazi (Ma’sumeh from Shiraz), in which he pits an ill-reputed sigheh/sex worker against an evil high-ranking cleric, highlighting the relationship between sigheh and the clerics. Ma’sumeh is a victim of the existing sociopolitical system that pushes her to marginalization, abuse, and violence. However, even though Ma’sumeh is stigmatized, she also takes up an important sexual position in the social imaginary of the novel’s world. Here once again, the sociocultural, political, and religious corruption of society is mapped out on the female body; and female sexuality is politicized through the interwoven network between sigheh/sex work and sociocultural and political institutions. These are the various sociopolitical and religious institutions that reduce women to the biological and corporeal, instrumentalizing the female body to political and religious advantage without viewing individual women as autonomous subjects. Nonetheless, by the end of the novel, Jamalzadeh desubjugates Ma’sumeh by giving her a voice to defend her rights and complain about the hypocrisy of the religious cleric to the Divine. Only within the realm of the divine court can she find justice. To have a voice, Ma’sumeh must rewrite the normative sociocultural, religious, and political scripts.
In this article, we show how judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have provided nationalists with an unexpected opportunity to promote a nationalist discourse that is seemingly in line with human rights while fundamentally at odds with the counter-majoritarian core of human rights. We start our analysis with two judgments in which the Court accepted the arguments of liberal democratic states to infringe fundamental rights of persons belonging to (immigrant) Muslim minorities in the name of “requirements of living together” or “social integration”: SAS v France (2014) and Osmanoglu and Kocabas v Switzerland (2017). Strikingly, the justifications by the states for these infringements point to concerns about perceived threats to national identity and culture. We show how nationalist politicians in countries with minority populations, including those in East Central Europe, have used justifications in terms of national self-protection, tacitly or explicitly, to pursue old anti–human rights agendas. The case law discussed here enabled them to present these justifications as ECtHR proof, notwithstanding the underlying nationalism.
This chapter first provides a broad definition of corruption and discusses why it is so toxic to effective governance. We then address how corruption has emerged as a key issue in the development process after being ignored for many decades. We explore the ways in which, without proper vigilance, government and corruption can become intertwined and feed off each other, destroying the foundations of human prosperity and the very purpose of governance. Existing efforts to tackle corruption at the national, regional and global levels are reviewed, and additional ways forward, particularly as regards the role of economic policies in developing the right sorts of incentives and institutions to reduce the incidence of corruption, are presented. Finally, proposals are put forth for the establishment of an International Anticorruption Court (IACC) to greatly strengthen and better implement a range of legal instruments that are already in place, but that have had limited success in checking the growth of multiple forms of corruption across the planet – affecting developing and developed countries alike. The setting up of an IACC is seen as a necessary adjunct to existing tools to check the spread of what many now regard as a global epidemic.
Strengthening the rule of law, at national and international levels, is a key goal of the international community, as expressed in multiple statements of heads of state, high-level meetings and resolutions made under the auspices of the United Nations. Developing an international order based upon the international rule of law is also a core objective of the UN Charter. However, with some limited exceptions, the international legal system has not yet matured into what would be considered a true rule-of-law system. Notable thinkers of various times and places have convincingly argued that the rule of law is a key element in establishing a global, sustainable peace, a perspective complemented by modern peace research. Key international legal institutions, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), remain essentially unreformed since 1945, as do UN Charter provisions on the peaceful settlement of disputes. This chapter sketches a range of potential, interlinked reforms to strengthen significantly the international rule of law, including peaceful settlement of disputes, the ICJ, the International Criminal Court, the establishment of an international judicial training institute and an office of international Attorney General. Further vital steps must be taken towards completing the half-built legal institutions that we currently possess.
We present an overview of the evolution of the United Nations General Assembly, its most important achievements and remaining weaknesses and relevance. It is argued that the UN Charter should be amended to introduce a system of weighted voting, to better reflect the relative significance and influence of its 193 members. A proposal is put forward that uses three variables to arrive at a set of weights for membership in the General Assembly: (i) population size, to reflect each member’s accumulated demographic history so that countries with larger populations will have a larger voice; (ii) the size of the member’s economy; and (iii) a UN membership factor that is equal for all countries. For the GDP variable, the weighted average of GDP at market prices and GDP at PPP rates is used. The merits and limitations of such a scheme are analyzed and a gradual system of direct election of Assembly members is proposed. The chapter also presents the UN Charter’s Articles 9–11 on General Assembly composition, functions and powers and discusses how these Articles should be amended to reflect the new system of weighted voting and the enhanced powers that are envisaged for the Assembly under a revised Charter.
A group of slaves suspected of brutally attacking a slave patrol in Fairfax County, Virginia, on leap day night of 1840 were placed on trial before a Virginia court of oyer and terminer, which found two of them - the brothers Alfred and Spencer – guilty and sentenced them to death for the crime. The local community divided in its response to the verdict. Whereas some whites in the area welcomed the slaves’ impending executions, others lobbied the governor for a commutation of sentence to spare their lives. Virginia governor Thomas Walker Gilmer reprieved the sentence of one of the brothers to sale and transportation outside the United States of America, but permitted the other brother to hang at the gallows.
Countermajoritarian institutions have shaped the course of modern Turkish politics. Because they have mainly acted as institutions of military tutelage, they have been identified as one of the greatest obstacles to democratization. The most notable countermajoritarian institutions in Turkey are the Constitutional Court, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the National Security Council, and the Council of Higher Education. This chapter analyzes the deliberations on possible reform to these institutions in the writing commission of the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlama Komisyonu, AUK’ from 2011 to 2013. It shows that delegates agreed on some issues and were close to reaching agreement on others. Yet, the requirement of consensus among all parties enabled certain actors to obstruct final agreements. The partial agreements ultimately yielded no lasting results. After adoption of constitutional amendments in 2017, it seems that countermajoritarian institutions now function as institutions of partisan, executive tutelage.
Access to indigenous commodities and artefacts produced new fashions and codes of conduct in London. Unlike global trade more broadly, colonization imbued Atlantic objects with specific meanings that involved a politics of appropriation that relied on both the presence and erasure of indigenous peoples. The social spaces of the metropolis fostered environments that encouraged gentlemen to behave like colonizers, from the private gatherings where they read verses that glorified conquest often fuelled by the actual intoxication of tobacco on the senses to court performances where gentlemen adorned themselves with feathers and danced in masques that advanced imperial agendas. Examining clusters of consumption involving globes, pearls, and tobacco pipes alongside verses, portraits, performances, and commonplace books offers evidence of how gentlemen presented their masculinity in ways that reflected their growing ambitions in the Americas. The Inns of Court, where gentlemen were encouraged to debate the political realm in creative and often daring ways, were particularly influential in bringing colonial interests and commodities within provocative redefinitions of civility. The strong sense of virtue and moral responsibility that developed alongside wit and conviviality created a distinct vision of how gentlemen fashioned themselves in an imperial polity.
Managing foreign affairs is in no small measure about anticipating the actions (and non-actions) of others, and about taking steps to limit the unexpected—and the undesired. Law has long been recognized as important to these tasks. Nevertheless, standard IR treatments often overlook important properties of law, even when trying to account for international law's effects on behavior. Chief among these overlooked properties is the fact that legal rules are formulated for general use, which means their provisions lack determinate meaning in relation to the full range of facts they may be applied to. Selecting and using legal rules to guide or assess behavior thus requires interpretation. Self-interested actors may differ regarding the applicability, scope, or meaning of individual rules, and still more so where multiple legal rules are in play. In situations where political stakes are high, powerful actors may not be content to leave all options on the table. Instead they may use interpretative tactics to mingle obligations from different agreements and, where needed, to augment relevant legal obligations in efforts to prospectively ensure, in the mode of Riker's heresthetics, that interlocutors feel compelled by legal circumstances to enact the more powerful actor's preferences. I demonstrate how agreement mingling and augmentation function in complex legal environments by reexaming US efforts to insulate its citizens from unwanted exercises of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
This chapter examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark First Amendment religious liberty cases to show how the judiciary has come to terms with the disputes that arise over religious liberty. The religion clauses are often seen as upholding the concept of individual rights and defending religious liberty against religious majoritarianism. However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses often belies this perception. This chapter demonstrates that the religion clauses largely epitomize majoritarianism. That is, rather than protecting religious minorities, the scope and protection of the religion clauses reflect both the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s broader constitutional rights jurisprudence, as well as the wider political landscape, both as it relates to judicial politics as well as contemporary social discourse.
Chapter 8 examines presidential remarks concerning Court cases prior to the modern presidency. This chapter enables us to place modern presidents in historical perspective and to illuminate how constitutional and political concerns motivated early presidents to discuss Court decisions. We examine all presidential remarks related to Supreme Court cases from 1789 through 1953 (Washington to Truman). We show that historic presidents rarely discussed the Court’s cases in their public rhetoric, choosing instead to share their opinions about the Court’s cases in their private correspondences. However, Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure marked the end of this norm, which was eviscerated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was in regular conflict with the Court.