To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 2 explains how the famine, which arose in the still-occupied western Netherlands after the Allies had liberated the southern part of the country, was caused and exacerbated by a complex culmination of various transportation and distribution problems. Interestingly, for the larger part it was not the overarching conflict between German and Dutch-Allied administrations, but a series of internal disputes and negotiations that influenced the course of the famine.
Chapter 3 focuses entirely on the reparation system at the ICC. The purpose of this chapter is to engage in an in-depth discussion of the development of reparative justice at the ICC, from theory to practice. This chapter analyzes some of the key challenges that the court is facing or will likely encounter in dealing with reparative justice within the context of international criminal prosecutions and trials. This chapter is devoted to fully engaging with the issues emerging from adding a reparative dimension in a primarily criminal process and how the criminal and civil dimension are intertwined, since reparations are dependent upon criminal conviction, and how both dimensions are reconciled in practice by the court and how they should be reconciled in the future. It also aims to provide a timely and original in-depth discussion of the first four cases dealing with reparations, which will pave the way and lay the foundation for the reparation system at the ICC for years to come. These cases are: the first case before the ICC (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo), which established principles of reparations, and its concrete impact for the development of reparations at the court; the case of the The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, which presented a unique set of issues, including individual reparations of a modest amount; the case of the The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, which presented original questions such as the concept of victims of cultural heritage; and the case of the The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, which is close to being decided at the time of writing, and will present unique challenges for the adjudication of reparations by the ICC considering the high number of victims authorized to participate in proceedings (more than 5,000). This in-depth analysis of cases is original and precisely one of the factors that distinguishes this volume from previous books in the field. A comparison of this ground-breaking jurisprudence informs how the decisions of the court align and diverge on key issues, shed light on unique challenges the court is facing and provides room for some recommendations for future development, based on concrete experiences.
The eleventh chapter steps back from the specifics of the discussion and investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the various proposed theories of causality in the face of certain contemporary philosophical challenges. As a case study, the chapter focuses on a central issue in contemporary discussions of religion and science: the reconciliation of religious claims about divine causation with scientific explanations that depart from the premise that the world is a causally closed system. Here the chapter first provides a brief overview of the important controversies in the discussion of religion and science that are relevant to this topic. It then explores whether the examined theories on causality are viable options for thinking about the divine causality without undermining the rigor of the scientific approach to the world.
Participation in activities that provide opportunities for mental, physical, or social engagement have been supported as cognitively protective in later life. Theories propose how mentally stimulating activities might improve or maintain specific cognitive abilities across the life course or reduce age-related cognitive changes, for example, while physical activities might promote brain health via a reduction in cardiovascular risk profiles. Given that such lifestyles and behaviors are potentially modifiable, positive associations between activity participation and maintained cognitive abilities in old age highlight leisure-time pursuits as targets for intervention. However, associations between activity participation and cognitive aging may be prone to reverse causation: those with higher engagement across the life course might have always had higher levels of cognitive ability. Life course approaches are therefore needed to correctly identify the potentially beneficial effects of activity participation. In addition, given the growth and development of cognitive abilities across the life span, there may be specific types of activity or engagement that are beneficial at different points. Understanding the associations between mental, physical, and social activity participation and cognitive aging supports the development of interventions against age-related cognitive decline, ranging from targeted cognitive training programs to broader engagement-based approaches. An ultimate goal of research exploring activity participation and cognitive aging is to provide clear and accurate information to individuals regarding the steps they might take to promote brain health in later life.
I review the hypothesis that neither space nor quantum mechanics is fundamental, and both are emergent from a more fundamental description that is neither. This fundamental description is a completion of quantum mechanics based on relational hidden variables. Here, relational means that they give a fuller description, not of an individual particle but of a network of relations among particles. This completion of quantum mechanics does not live in space, rather space is an emergent description of an underlying network of relations. Since locality is, in this sense, emergent, locality can be disordered, and one of the effects of this is quantum nonlocality. This summarizes a line of thought that weaves through many of my papers on quantum foundations, from the early 1980s to the present.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to dative case. It starts by listing a number of theta-roles with which dative case-marking is closely associated, such as recipient, benefactive, malefactive, goal and experiencer. Examples from different languages are provided. Additional uses of the dative are then discussed, such as: dative arguments of modal predicates, possessive dative, co-referential dative constructions (CDCs), ethical dative, affected dative and the use of the dative that creates a reduced agentivity effect. The discussion covers the arguments that are considered to constitute dative subjects, relates to the question of their syntactic status, and addresses certain subject case alternations. Syntactic and semantic analyses of the dative are then considered, including the empty preposition approach, the applicative head analyses, and accounts based on binary features, such as [+/−c] (causes change) and [+/−m] (mental state is relevant).
On one interpretation, Jaspers’ discussion of imaginative understanding explains how we know causal relations between psychological states. Cognitive neuroscience models of delusions typically aim at characterizing the organic disturbance that underlies the ‘primary delusion’; then, it’s assumed, mentalistic causation takes over and generates the other symptoms. No account is given of the biological underpinning of psychological causation. Imaginative understanding is not well-described by ‘simulation’ models. Simulation theory is predictive and does not attempt to find causation. Imagination here is best understood as correlative with the idea of a psychological process; imaginative understanding of psychological processes drives our ordinary conception of mental causation. We know roughly what a psychological process is and what a biological process is. But there seems to be no presumption we can map one onto the other. I review the options here and something of their implications for how we think about mind and brain in psychiatry.
This chapter explores some issues having to do with levels in psychiatry and elsewhere in science. I distinguish among several different notions of level and discuss why talk of levels is sometimes useful in science, although it can also be a source of considerable confusion. I defend the claim that it is legitimate to think in terms of causal relations between levels (including so-called downward causation from upper to lower levels) against several recent criticisms, providing scientific example of when this motion seems appropriate.
Chapter 2 illustrates how material necessity reflects a two-fold truism that it is in each belligerent’s strategic interest to do what is necessary and to avoid what is unnecessary. The notion evaluates how the means taken advances the ends sought under the prevailing circumstances. A given act can be a military necessity compared to some alternatives, yet a non-necessity compared to some other alternatives. Acts that are wasteful, excessive, inapposite, futile or purposeless are improvable military non-necessities rather than solely the results of war’s irresistible friction. The necessity assessment of particular action cannot be meaningfully generalised or seen outside of its factual context.
Our knowledge and understanding of the structure and function of complex host-associated communities has grown exponentially in the last decade through improvements in sequencing technologies. Despite this, there are still many outstanding research questions, which will undoubtably lead to many more. Concerted effort is required to elucidate the composition and function of taxonomic groups other than bacteria that constitute host microbiomes, and to extend our current cataloguing efforts to non-model and field-based host organisms. Further to this, we need to continue to move beyond the 'who?' question provided by relatively cheap amplicon sequencing to gain a better understanding of 'what?' the microbiome is doing, using metatranscriptomics approaches. Critically, we need to understand how members of the microbiome interact to confer function. Given the current unprecedented environmental change, microbiome plasticity may prove vital to host resilience and fitness. Furthermore, there is considerable potential for microbial biotechnology to improve numerous aspects of humanity, although care must be taken to ensure environmental and social justice prevail.
The existence of the self with its own causal powers is an unpopular idea in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, I find that attention provides evidence of such a self. In this chapter I argue that attention provides room for a particular understanding of the self that aligns with nonreductive materialism, against physicalism. As I discuss, attention provides experiential evidence, as when it seems to us that we effortfully direct our attention; it provides behavioral evidence, as when we identify the difference between endogenous and exogenous attention in others; and it provides neural evidence, as when top-down attention is distinguished from bottom-up attention on the basis of scale. The best way of understanding this evidence, I argue, is that a subject, understood as macro-scale patterns of brain activity, directs attention. One might interpret this through "weak emergence," but I argue in favor of a stronger emergence, known as "contextual emergence": the subject emerges from neural activity in the context of being associated with a body that engages with a world. This subject-centered account is unique among philosophers and better fits the available evidence.
This article addresses the manner in which accounts of profits are quantified when they are ordered against fiduciaries. Unlike previous scholarship, which has often sought to explain recent case law by reference to preconceived conceptual models, the present article addresses the topic by drawing on the reasoning adopted in the cases over a longer period, with a view to helping with the practical resolution of future cases, while also offering arguments drawn from that analysis as to the correct approach to the conceptual questions that arise.
Dickinson wants to affect her readers, but not to overwhelm them. Is language’s power literal, its causation direct? Even if it might be, language’s material, sensational aspects must be converted to meanings. The question for Dickinson is to what extent that conversion is automatic, irresistible. Dickinson uses the frameworks of Common Sense and Humean philosophies to think about the nature of power in causation. The more naïve or Common Sense realist version of “electric sympathy” literalizes words’ causative power, while Dickinson’s associationist rhetoric of sympathy observes a skeptical gap between persons. Campbell’s Humean rhetoric insists that cause is attributive and interpretive. Bain’s neuroscience suggests that electricity is integral, not inimical, to the perceptual process. Consistently, Dickinson employs a figurative, ambiguous style which maps onto the recipient’s processes of inference down to the neurological, that is, electrical, level, inducing a lightning in the mind which is the reader’s own power.
The aim of this article is to develop an understanding-based argument for an explicitly political specification of the concept of race. It is argued that a specification of race in terms of hierarchical social positions is best equipped to guide causal reasoning about racial inequality in the public sphere. Furthermore, the article provides evidence that biological and cultural specifications of race mislead public reasoning by encouraging confusions between correlates and causes of racial inequality. The article concludes with a more general case for incorporating empirical evidence about public reasoning into philosophical debates about competing specifications of the concept of race.
A competition law infringement is capable of damaging different subjects at the same time, virtually all the market players that are directly or even indirectly connected with the business of the competition law infringer. Economic activities are indeed structured on value chains, which are interconnected networks of contracts and hierarchies operating in a market. Here, the action or decision of a market player may impact many of the other market participants, affecting both their future strategies and their actual assets. For instance, the abuse of a dominant position causing the foreclosure of a competitor may equally impact on the business partners of that competitor and on its employees, as well as on the consumers of both markets. We will call ‘indirect economic losses’ all those damages that are a consequence of an infliction of damage upon a third party. When the harm is inflicted upon a third person which in turn causes harm to the claimant, we will instead refer to it as ‘secondary harms’.
Competition law infringements may cause economic losses which are protected by EU and national laws. Liability for compensation of private damages in EU competition law is the result of the judicial interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), with the two seminal cases Courage and Manfredi, introduced the principle of right to compensation for violation of competition law, stating that 'any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited'. Article 3 of the Directive 104/2014 (the ‘Damages Directive’) on competition damages actions has then imposed the transposition of this principle into national laws.
The European Union law grants the right to claim for damages to anyone harmed by an antitrust infringement, be they consumers, undertakings or public authorities. A competition law infringement may cause economic harm simultaneously to several market participants. Economic harms may indeed flow from an antitrust infringement in the form of price overcharges or other economic loss – for instance, lost profits or lost chances. Tort laws generally establish the liability of the infringer through the principle of corrective justice, based on which the wrongdoer has a duty to repair only the wrongful losses that his or her conduct has caused. Along these lines, the principle of corrective justice dispenses a general rule whereby a person harmed by a tort must be able to recover damages to restore the same situation, at least from an economic perspective, existing before the breach.
National courts have generally embraced a multifold account for causation in virtually all Member States. However, the different national tort law systems structure the multi-stage accounts differently. National judges enforce competition law rules largely relying on their domestic laws of obligations. For this reason, this chapter examines the bundle of tort law and competition law that applies to establish causation in competition damages actions before national courts of England, Germany, France and Italy. These four jurisdictions were selected because of the size of their economies, the amount of litigation and the fact that they show four different, almost paradigmatic, approaches to causation.
Causation in competition law damages actions shows peculiarities that distinguish it from any other tort in civil law and common law countries. Antitrust damages claims are based on pure economic losses made compensable by the violation of statutorily protected interests and EU laws (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). The claims are therefore based on losses caused by actions distorting market dynamics which negatively affect the assets of undertakings or consumers operating in the same market. The wide range of subjects and heads of damages involved in this process make the identification of the causal link a particularly difficult task for parties and judges. In confirmation of this, the analysis of national case law suggests that claimants are often discouraged from bringing damages claims characterized by high causal uncertainty.
The chapter shows that more sophisticated difference-making theories of causation that draw on so-called causal models can accommodate mental causation too. Causal modelling theories invoke more complex relations of difference-making than the simple principle about causation that was used in previous chapters. These relations of difference-making are represented by causal models. Accommodating mental causation – either in the non-reductive physicalist case or in the dualist case – calls for some heterodoxy in model-building. If the heterodox models are allowed, however, they prove useful not merely for explaining mental causation, but also for capturing the distinction between higher–level causes that are explanatorily relevant and higher-level causes that are not. The chapter also discusses the interventionist theory, an especially prominent member of the causal modelling family, in relation to mental causation.