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To date, there is no systematic research on the overlapping challenges of wildlife conservation and security in South Sudan, where the wildlife service (WLS) has institutionally survived for over a century while contending with poor state capacity and responsibility for protected areas (PAs) that cover vast territories characterized by chronic insecurity and food scarcity. Integrated into the country’s “Organized Forces,” South Sudan’s park rangers play roles beyond conservation as armed actors in complex conflicts. Data obtained from archival research and field interviews shows that South Sudan’s wildlife authorities have persisted since the colonial period in spite and because of chronic warfare.
Around the world, armed conflict is increasingly occurring in capital cities and governments are relying on pro-government, rurally recruited, militia to suppress anti-government political violence. Pendle and Maror draw lessons from South Sudan where recruits from rural areas were brought to Juba to help defend the government. Drawing on ethnographic observations and qualitative interviews with combatants, this article uses “rural radicalism” to argue that patterns of violence by these rurally recruited forces were shaped by histories of rural violence over previous decades and can be read to include a political objective that challenges the inequities in safety and security between rural areas and the capital city.
Post-cessation nationhood in South Sudan presented a paradoxical situation: a country united during struggle is fragmented after independence. Among the triggers for this scenario was the death of Dr John Garang de Mabior—the country’s founding father. This article is a multidisciplinary semiotic critique of Akuol de Mabior’s film, No Simple Way Home (2023), against the history of South Sudanese nationhood. Without claiming a political scientific analysis, the author proposes that South Sudan’s crisis of nationhood is symptomatic of a quest for a unifying icon. He theorizes the protagonist’s quintessence of motherhood as a semiotic gesture of her de jure iconicity of unified nationhood.
We assessed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the protocol adaptations on cost and cost-effectiveness of community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) program in South Sudan.
Design:
Retrospective program expenditure-based analysis of non-governmental organisation (NGO) CMAM programs for COVID-19 period (April 2020–December 2021) in respect to pre-COVID period (January 2019–March 2020).
Setting:
Study was conducted as part of a bigger evaluation study in South Sudan.
Participants:
International and national NGOs operating CMAM programs under the nutrition cluster participated in the study.
Results:
The average cost per child recovered from the programme declined by 20 % during COVID from $133 (range: $34–1174) pre-COVID to $107 (range: $20–333) during COVID. The cost per child recovered was negatively correlated with programme size (pre-COVID r-squared = 0·58; during COIVD r-squared = 0·50). Programmes with higher enrollment were cheaper compared with those with low enrolment. Salaries, ready to use food and community activities accounted for over two-thirds of the cost per recovery during both pre-COVID (69 %) and COVID (79 %) periods. While cost per child recovered decreased during COVID period, it did not negatively impact on the programme outcome. Enrolment increased by an average of 19·8 % and recovery rate by 4·6 % during COVID period.
Conclusions:
Costs reduced with no apparent negative implication on recovery rates after implementing the COVID CMAM protocol adaptations with a strong negative correlation between cost and programme size. This suggests that investing in capacity, screening and referral at existing CMAM sites to enable expansion of caseload maybe a preferable strategy to increasing the number of CMAM sites in South Sudan.
This piece recounts the efforts by NGO Sign of Hope (SoH) to rectify human rights violations in South Sudan, which manifested themselves as drinking water pollution by the oil industry. Committed to exposing and remediating this water contamination, SoH was able to prompt the automobile company Daimler’s CSR to engage in extended dialogue with the oil industry stakeholders in Unity State. Despite a tactful use of various methods ranging from cooperation to confrontation, SoH’s campaign did not lead the oil producers to reverse the harm inflicted on the people of Unity State. When SoH tried to hold these companies accountable, SoH had the impression that it was hitting an elastic wall. This piece identifies lessons which may help to counter corporate human rights violations and compensate for the weakness of CSR in fragile states and in the face of corporate irresponsibility.
Many countries write their constitutions with some form of international involvement. Internationalized constitutional assistance has been made easier by technology as well as trade and political exigencies. The question, therefore, is: How does this inevitable foreign influence impact constitutional legitimacy? This article discusses this question and asserts that foreign influence interacts with three approaches of constitutional design to shape constitutional legitimacy: (a) popular participation, (b) elites’ contracts, and (c) transnational constitutional implants. Such a transactional relationship is referred to as the “three-stone legitimacy theory”, which implicates both the internal and the external legitimacy of a constitution. The former means citizens’ acceptance that a constitution meets their aspirations, while the latter refers to the international community's satisfaction with the resulting constitution as guaranteeing the universal democratic ethos. The article ends with a proposition conceptualized as a “blueprint” for a democratic constitutional legitimacy in South Sudan.
The article examines how to address the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, which accuses the Government of South Sudan and the rebels of committing “crimes against humanity” and violating “international humanitarian law” in the war of December 2013. The Commission recommends “an Africa-led, Africa-owned, Africa-resourced legal mechanism, under the aegis of the African Union and with support from the United Nations, to bring those with the greatest responsibility at the highest level to accountability” in a court. Second, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan asked for establishing a hybrid court in South Sudan to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of “genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”. The Cabinet of South Sudan approved, in its resolution on 29 January 2021, the establishment of the court. On the other hand, the Government of South Sudan rejected accountability for the perpetrators of international crimes in its resolution at the Transition Justice Conference and recommended “amnesty” for those admitting the commission of international crimes in Juba, Malakal, Bor and Bentiu. The research findings show that amnesty threatens peace and security because customary law rejects amnesty. Its implementation generates systematic vengeance from the clan of those killed. The research recommends the establishment of a hybrid court that adopts the complementarity principle in compatibility with the African customary law of blood compensation. The authoritative national criminal courts in South Sudan omit capital punishment on the grounds that (a) killer(s) pay(s) blood compensation, apok or cot, to the survivors of (a) killed person(s) with 51 cattle. The payment changes the penalties of life imprisonment, which international criminal law imposes on the perpetrators of international crimes and the death penalty, which African criminal law imposes on the confirmed killer(s). Finally, the tribunal imposes 10-year terms of imprisonment on the confirmed perpetrators of international crimes.
This article explores radio broadcasting and monitoring by and about Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) leader John Garang during Sudan's second civil war, focusing on the core period of Radio SPLA broadcasting (1984–91). Through oral history, memoirs, and international monitoring reports, the article analyzes radio conversations between Garang and his critics — northern Sudanese, southern Sudanese, and international — to argue that radio battles directly shaped the struggle for political authority between Garang and the Sudanese government, and within the SPLM/A elite. Radio allowed Garang to speak to a dispersed audience within and beyond Sudan, presenting an alternative history of Sudan, publicizing his vision of a New Sudan, and asserting his pseudo-sovereign control of SPLM/A-held territory. However, Radio SPLA did not exist in a vacuum; Garang's rivals responded on government and international radio to criticize his leadership in targeted, personal terms. Radio thus powerfully mediated between personal, national, and international politics during the SPLM/A's liberation struggle.
Disability inclusion has become a crucial issue for humanitarian action, at least at the international policy level. However, little is known about how humanitarian actors are “doing inclusion” in practice. With a case study on South Sudan, this article examines whether the increase in publications, policy tools and guidelines has made humanitarian action more inclusive for persons with disabilities, and how stakeholders can overcome persisting barriers for persons with disabilities. The article demonstrates noticeable progress in data collection, capacity-building, the removal of barriers and meaningful participation, but humanitarians still lack the skills, confidence and resources to address many persisting barriers. To advance inclusion, donors and humanitarian organizations must invest more time and resources in capacity-building and coordination.
This paper explores China's mode of medical intervention in South Sudan and compares it with the medical humanitarianism and global health imaginaries and modes of intervention that characterize the activities of the wider international community, especially NGOs and faith-based organizations. In their provision of medical aid to South Sudan, organizations of the international community largely draw on a discourse of suffering and a framework of emergency response to humanitarian crises in post-conflict settings, which often translates into vertical programmes which involve direct governance of the South Sudanese population. In contrast, China's contemporary medical interventions in South Sudan are a mixture of health diplomacy, health infrastructure and development aid, an assemblage which can be understood as a “non-suffering” model of care and a loosely defined apparatus of biopolitics. However, the obvious gap between national goals and the daily experiences of individual Chinese doctors suggests that this will be an uneven process of “becoming.”
Though constitutional drafting is a national affair, it is not isolated from the international legal setting in which it is embedded. Sometimes, the process of drafting itself may be directly governed by international law (for example, a United Nations mandate). On other occasions, constitutional design may be influenced by incentives generated by international law (such as EU membership). Either way, the creation of a new constitution invariably requires reflection upon the status and role of international law in the normative hierarchy of a country. Using Sudan as a case study, this chapter explores the significant role played by international law in the drafting of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution of 2005.
States usually intervene in failed states for broader strategic or humanitarian motives. However, chapter 6 uses Somalia, the Democratic Repblic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan to show that most African interveners lent their support to one side or the other in these lawless lands in the pursuit of their own interests. In the DRC, external interveners were primarily interested in looting rather than in Congo’s stability. In Somalia, Ethiopia switched from hostile to supportive military interventions in an attempt to dampen Islamist influence while also creating a weak transitional government it could easily manipulate. Kenya and Eritrea, in contrast, intervened in order to establish a strong Somali state capable of counterbalancing Ethiopia’s hegemonic aspirations in the horn of Africa. Unlike the first two cases, South Sudan did not experience multiple military interventions despite encountering similar conditions. This negative case is the result of Ethiopia’s restraint from taking any military action to support its kin, the Nuer, because it feared upsetting the ethnic balance in its eastern region. Results from qualitative comparative analysis show that most African interveners are motivated to dispatch their militaries to failed states by the presence of prominent roles, rebel sanctuaries, lootable resources, and domestic pressures.
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is one of Africa's most notorious armed rebel groups, having operated across Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When they entered the Juba Peace Talks with the Ugandan Government in 2006, the peace deal seemed like a gift to fighters who had for years barely been surviving in Central Africa's jungles. Yet the talks failed. Why? Based on exclusive interviews with LRA fighters and their notorious leader Joseph Kony, Mareike Schomerus provides insights into how the LRA experienced the Juba Talks, revealing developing dynamics and deep distrust within a conflict system and how these became entrenched through the peace negotiations. In so doing, Schomerus offers an explanation as to why current approaches to ending armed violence not only fail but how they actively contribute to their own failure, and calls for a new approach to contemporary peacemaking.
This chapter gives a detailed and dramatic account of the first year of the Juba Peace Talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and the Government of Uganda. It highlights the many tensions and contradictions that occurred, for example, the pressure to bring LRA senior commanders to the table while they feared for their security, Ugandan government insistence to put a deadline on the talks, the lack of capacity within the LRA/M delegation to deliver negotiation papers, the technical and military challenge to have the LRA fighters assemble, the contradictions within international approaches that simultaneously supported the ICC while also requesting that to back off. Ownership of the process became complex for the LRA/M who sought broad civil society participation while aiming to maintain their powerful hold on the process. In offering a narrative of the convoluted and complex events of this first year of peace talks, the chapter also argues that the developing dynamics of the talks made the pursuit of peace not just an unthankful but rather a damaging experience: For the LRA/M, the start to the negotiations was an experience of continuation, with existing political and military power relations entrenched, rather than transformed.
This chapter leverages a within-case variation in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a rebel organization that operated in a country that neighbored Eritrea at the same time as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) from Chapter 5. The SPLM/A initially articulated less transformative goals, and despite knowing about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) governance, refused to introduce any elements of it, consistent with expectations. In 1994, however, the SPLM/A articulated a new set of moderately transformative objectives and correspondingly introduced governance initiatives that more closely approached, but did not replicate exactly, the CCP’s strategy, also consistent with expectations. The SPLM/A in conjunction with the EPLF and Eritrean Liberation Front cases in Chapter 5 offers a comprehensive test of the theory using the full range of variation in the independent variables (transformativity of rebel goals) and the corresponding range of the dependent variable (rebel governance strategies).
Sudanese national governments have attempted to forge Sudan as an Islamic state for much of its postcolonial history. Southern Sudan, with its long exposure to Christian mission work, rejected this agenda and waged two civil wars against the state. Josephine Bakhita, Sudan’s first Catholic saint, stood at the epicenter of this maelstrom. This chapter investigates Bakhita’s sociopolitical significance in recent Sudanese (and South Sudanese) history. Born in the nineteenth century, Bakhita was enslaved in her youth but, once free, eventually became a Canossian sister. Pope John Paul II injected her life and legacy into calls for human dignity to be respected in a context rife with abuses that included slavery and religious persecution. Her name continued to carry resonance after the war through Radio Bakhita, a station that became linked with attacks on expressive freedom. Bakhita’s afterlife shows how a religious figure can be injected into campaigns against secular social ills and become a symbol linked to different abuses in the same space in different times.
The labels ‘state fragility’ and ‘civil war’ suggest that security in several African countries has broken down. While people do experience insecurity in some parts of conflict-affected countries, in other areas they live in relative security. Between 2014 and 2018, the author travelled to South Sudan and the Central African Republic during their ongoing civil wars and into Somalia’s breakaway state of Somaliland to gain insights from the people whose security is at stake. He develops the concept of a ‘security arena’, wherein he investigate security as the outcome of actors’ local political-ordering struggles on a fluidity–stability spectrum. He finds that neither stable nor fluid ordering per se creates security or insecurity. Security improves when actors seek to cohabit all parts of arenas by using varying ordering forms in a complementary fashion.
Chapter 2 provides the historical and local background to the analysis. It describes political developments in the Central African Republic (CAR), Somaliland, and South Sudan before, during, and after colonization. These changes shape the way these countries’ respective political systems function today. The chapter then moves to the local level and provides a brief description of the key actors and issues at stake in each of the nine local security arenas. These case descriptions on the national and local level will form the basis of the analysis that follows.
The civilian-combatant frame persists as the main legal lens through which lawyers organize the relationships of conflict zone actors. As a result, little attention has been paid in international legal scholarship to different gradations of ‘civilianness’ and the ways in which some civilians might compete to distinguish themselves from each other. Drawing attention to international humanitarian actors – particularly those working for NGOs – this article explores the micro-strategies these actors engage in to negotiate their relative status in war. Original qualitative empirical findings from South Sudan illuminate the way in which humanitarians struggle over distinction with individuals working for the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMISS. As is shown, humanitarian actors are doing away with a static civilian-combatant binary in their daily practice. A more fluid logic informs both their self-conceptualization and their interactions with others who share the operational space. Humanitarian actors envision civilianness as a contingent concept, and they operate according to a continuum along which everything is a matter of degree and subtle gradation. As civilianness is detached from the civilian, any given actor might acquire or shed civilian-like, or combatant-like, characteristics at any moment. The distinction practices that humanitarian actors enact can be understood as a bid for legibility, so that they might be rendered intelligible in international law and in the eyes of other actors as a special kind of civilian – the ‘civilian plus’.