This chapter articulates the central argument (why a new legal form for social enterprises in India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore is needed and what it should entail); explains why the four Asian jurisdictions are selected as case studies; and examines the purposes of social enterprises and their two main business models. The chapter then provides an overview of social enterprises in the four Asian jurisdictions including: their operating domains, the drivers of the development of social enterprises, the challenges faced by them, the three main conflicts of interests afflicting them, and the legal forms used by social enterprises. Importantly, the chapter shows that the legal forms available to or used by social enterprises in the four Asian jurisdictions are unable to properly address the conflicts of interests, and thus, a new legal form is required.

With the exception of India and Pakistan, South Asian countries have yet to properly implement their competition laws and policies. This chapter explores ways in which the implementation gap may be bridged, focusing on factors which may motivate governments or competition authorities in these countries to engage more meaningfully with competition enforcement and also considering strategies for doing so. The chapter argues that governments and competition authorities are more likely to support competition enforcement in their contexts if they are convinced of its potential to help them realise their goals of economic and social developmental goals. It also observes these countries’ growing engagement in the digital economy for its potential for growth and development and explores the role of competition enforcement for regulating e-commerce platforms. Finally, the chapter considers how the South Asian countries may learn from each other, and strategies for competition enforcement.

India and Pakistan adopted modern competition legislations in 2002 and 2007 respectively. This chapter traces and compares the adoption of modern competition legislations in the two countries to understand how these shaped the schemes and ambits of these legislations as well as the extent of their compatibility with and legitimacy in their respective countries. The chapter appraises the pre-conditions of transfer in India and Pakistan focusing particularly on their legal and political institutional landscapes and evaluates their respective motivations for adopting modern competition legislations. It also identifies the transfer mechanisms and the nature and range of legal and political institutions engaged by these countries in the course of adoption, and examines how the interplay of these institutions impacts the compatibility, legitimacy, and content of the adopted legislations.

Sanctions are not only central to competition law enforcement for their punitive and deterrent value but are also important indicators of the successful performance of competition law authorities. The Indian and Pakistani competition legislations empower the CCI and CCP to impose both monetary and behavioural sanctions as appropriate, and in the years they have been operational, both authorities have utilised the full range of these powers, albeit with varying success. This chapter examines the penal strategies of the CCI and the CCP as manifested in the sanctions and penalties that they have imposed over time, and argues that these strategies as well as the extent to which the CCI and CCP have succeeded in recovering the penalties are directly impacted by the compatibility and legitimacy generated in the adoption process, and indirectly impacted by the establishment of success of these countries in adopting the competition enforcement infrastructure envisaged in the adopted legislations.

Drawing on 1,384 notifications, this chapter demonstrates increased nominal support concentrated among few members that has declined as a percentage of world agricultural value of production, with a shift toward relatively more support by developing country members. Trade-distorting Art. 6 support, subject to limit or exempt, has declined even nominally, while rising in China and India. There is a substantial shift toward green box support that accounts in recent years for nearly 80% of all support, with China accounting for over 40% of these expenditures. Given the exemptions and unused space for support subject to limits, the Agreement has not required members to lower their distortionary support. It has, however, provided guidance to policy evolution and a basis for benchmarking members’ support decisions. The trends and levels of Art. 6 and green box support reflect both members’ policy changes and continuing differences in their chosen support measures.

The most fundamental measure of the global eclipse of Britishness is to be found in the politics of language. The narrowing semantic range of imperial Britishness was epitomized by India’s request for admission into the post-war Commonwealth in 1947 as the first member to adopt a Republican constitution. Resolving this dilemma also raised the question of whether the Commonwealth should retains its customary ‘British’ adjectvie, pressing the ‘British Commonwealth’ to the limit of its capacity to bind an increasingly atomized membership. By the early 1960s, the UK Government itself was inclined to repatriate the meaning of Britishness in official usage to refer only to themselves - itself a major landmark in downsizing the idea of Britain. This chapter traces the protracted diplomatic wrangling over the British name itself in the post-war world, with profound consequences for its future viability.

This chapter traces the long legal journey towards the recognition of advance directives (ADs) in India and contextualises these within the initial obstacles as well as the mitigating forces. The issues span the legalisation of passive euthanasia, the decriminalisation of attempted suicide and the eventual recognition of the right to privacy in India in 2017, as well as the development of psychiatric advance directives under the Mental Healthcare Act 2017. These developments culminated in the guidelines of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India in March 2018, which contain complex and lengthy procedures and requirements. We argue that the issues arising through these developments, as well as a number of cultural and religious influences, need further review. In particular, we focus on the role of family in end-of-life decision-making, and argue that in the law commission reports as well as in court decisions, courts and medical professionals have been represented as protectors of the patients from their families. As far as the practice of ADs is concerned, we present our survey results, which demonstrate a lack of awareness regarding advance directives.

For much of the decade prior to 1940, Churchill was out of office and often seen as a warmonger. He saw appeasement as a policy not befitting a country of Britain’s standing that failed to take account of innate German militarism. One of his most effective tactics in opposing it was his evocative use of history, drawing parallels between his own life and that of his eighteenth-century ancestor, the 1st Duke of Marlborough. To Churchill, the British government’s dealings with Gandhi and the Congress Party were also a form of appeasement. There was a paradox in his thinking; that the forms of nationalism that bolstered British international power were legitimate, while those that did not were not. Churchill’s opposition to Hitler was based on his own first-hand experiences while researching his Marlborough biography and on his reading of the German ‘mental map’. The chapter traces his evolving response from the German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 through to the Munich Crisis of 1938 and beyond. It ends by analysing Churchill’s path to power as prime minister, suggesting that far from being a triumph of opportunity, there were simply no other suitable candidates for the post.

The chapter introduces Churchill’s army career between 1895 and 1900, but does so from an important new perspective: using his exploits in Cuba, India, the Sudan and South Africa to explore the origins of his lifelong interest in intelligence and clandestine operations. It argues that his first foray overseas to Cuba was in the ‘well-established tradition of the British amateur spy’ but that he maintained his interest in military intelligence thereafter through the connections he made to support his writing and journalism on the Indian north-west frontier, while attached to Kitchener’s expedition in the Sudan and later as a war correspondent and then soldier in South Africa. The author looks at the intelligence lessons that Churchill learned, including the power of guerrilla insurrection, the importance of properly resourced intelligence services, the comparative roles of the civil and military intelligence arms and the need for a managed relationship with the press.

The British Empire provided the context in which both Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt came to maturity and defined and aggravated their differences as national leaders. The chapter begins by comparing the shared beliefs and values of Churchill and Theodore Roosevelt on empire and race before showing how Franklin Roosevelt emerged from his cousin’s shadow to develop a hostility towards the British Empire inspired by genuine idealism as well as calculating pragmatism. It documents the tension between Churchill’s imperialism and his appreciation that American participation in the war was the key to victory, examining the differences between the two leaders before looking at their wartime relationship through the lens of their very different responses to events in the British Empire, especially in India. Churchill’s dispute with Roosevelt on the subject of the British Empire went to the heart of the relationship between a Democrat president who wanted to create a new world order imbued with American values and a Conservative prime minister who aimed to maintain the old world in all its glory. This disjunction threatened the stability of the wartime alliance.

The chapter sees India as a stain on Churchill’s reputation. As a young officer, Churchill spent twenty-two months in India, representing his longest concentrated stay outside of Britain, but his prejudice against Anglo-Indians meant that he engaged only with the elites of British India and remained isolated. The Empire and its permanence became the bedrock of a deep-seated conviction just at the time of India’s nationalist upsurge for self-rule and independence. He condemned the Amritsar massacre but thereafter opposed all ideas for Indian political evolution. The fact that he held no responsibility for India affairs apart from May 1940 to July 1945 did not stop him speaking about the subcontinent. His campaign against the India Act of 1935 was conducted at enormous political cost to himself and left the leaders of the Indian independence movement embittered, contributing to Hindu–Muslim polarisation. During the Second World War Churchill manipulated Britain’s response to the Indian independence movement, titling policy in favour of Jinnah and the creation of Pakistan. His response to the Bengal Famine has to be framed in terms of race.

Constitutionalism in the decolonising world was not merely an adoption of a set of norms pre-fabricated in the West. A materialist analysis of the Indian constitution argues for the socio-historical specificity of the post-colonial constituent project. Externally the goal of decolonisation was not just political freedom but also economic sovereignty. Internally an under-developed and unequal society posed a persistent danger of unrest for the new regime. Across much of the post-colonial world the solution was a project of planned state-led development and social transformation. The post-colonial constitution was designed to facilitate and realise this goal. These projects demanded the primacy of sovereignty over property and, hence, the constitution differentiated from metropolitan norms privileging property and constraining state interventions. It was a constitution by and for administrators and planners who were the vanguards of Third Worldism. Sans a popular mobilisation, however, a top down project of transformation through constitution failed. As the fortunes of planning declined and the Third World was ‘liberalised’, lawyers supplanted the administrators as the primary custodians of the post-colonial constitutions. Projects of planned transformation gave way to social rights litigation.