Quizalofop-resistant rice allows for over-the-top applications of quizalofop, a herbicide that inhibits acetyl-coenzyme A carboxylase. However, previous reports have indicated that quizalofop applied postemergence may cause significant injury to quizalofop-resistant rice. Therefore, field experiments were conducted to evaluate the response of quizalofop-resistant rice cultivars to quizalofop applications across different planting dates. Under controlled conditions, the effects of soil moisture content, air temperature, and light intensity on quizalofop-resistant rice sensitivity to quizalofop were investigated. In the planting date experiment, injury of more than 11 percentage points was observed on early-planted rice compared with late-planted rice at the 5-leaf stage, with higher injury observed under saturated soil conditions. However, quizalofop applications at the labeled rate caused ≤16% reduction in yield regardless of planting environment. Quizalofop-resistant cultivars exhibited more injury by at least 25 percentage points when soil was maintained at 90% or 100% of field capacity because rice cultivars ‘PVL01’, ‘PVL02’, and ‘RTv7231 MA’ exhibited ≥42%, 30%, and ≥54% injury, respectively, compared with ≤10%, ≤5%, and ≤22% injury, respectively, at 40% or 50% of field capacity, pooled over rating timing. Greater injury ranging from 18% to 31% was observed on quizalofop-resistant rice grown under low light intensity (600 µmol m−2s−1) compared with 5% to 14% injury under high light intensity (1,150 µmol m−2s−1). The injury persisted from 7 to 28 d after 5-leaf stage application (DAFT), averaged over quizalofop-resistant cultivars and air temperatures (20/15 C and 30/25 C day/night, respectively). At 7 DAFT, greater injury (by 5 to 21 percentage points) was observed on quizalofop-resistant cultivars; PVL01, PVL02, and RTv7231 MA exhibited 33%, 9%, and 58% injury, respectively, under 20/15 C temperature conditions compared with 13%, 4%, and 37% injury, respectively, under 30/25 C day/night conditions averaged over light intensities. Overall, quizalofop is likely to cause a greater risk for injury to quizalofop-resistant rice if it is applied under cool, cloudy, and moist soil conditions.

Injury to quizalofop-resistant rice was reported in some fields following postemergence applications of quizalofop. Glyphosate-resistant (GR) corn, cotton, and soybean, and imidazolinone-resistant rice are grown near quizalofop-resistant rice. Herbicide drift from glyphosate and imazethapyr and the resulting crop injury and potential yield loss is a cause of concern for producers. Field experiments conducted near Colt, and Keiser, AR, in 2021 evaluated whether low rates of glyphosate or imazethapyr interact with sequential quizalofop applications to exacerbate injury to quizalofop-resistant rice compared to quizalofop applications alone. Herbicide treatments consisted of a low rate of glyphosate (90 g ae ha−1) or imazethapyr (10.7 g ai ha−1) applied 10, 7, 4, and 0 d before the 2-leaf growth stage of rice, and glyphosate or imazethapyr, at the same rate and timings, followed by quizalofop at 120 g ai ha−1 applied to 2-leaf rice. All plots treated with quizalofop received a subsequent application of the same herbicide and rate at the 5-leaf rice stage. At 28 d after final treatment (DAFT), glyphosate followed by quizalofop the same day to 2-leaf rice caused 77% injury compared with 58% when glyphosate was applied alone, regardless of location. Glyphosate followed by quizalofop the same day reduced rough rice grain yield by 67% compared with 33% when glyphosate was applied alone to 2-leaf rice at the Colt location. Application of imazethapyr followed by quizalofop the same day to 2-leaf rice caused more injury (63% and 19% injury at the Colt and Keiser locations, respectively) than imazethapyr alone (42% and 7% injury at the Colt and Keiser locations, respectively) at 35 DAFT. Overall, glyphosate and imazethapyr followed by quizalofop applications worsened injury compared to glyphosate, imazethapyr, and quizalofop applications alone. As the interval between exposure to a low rate of glyphosate or imazethapyr and quizalofop decreases, the detrimental effect of herbicide on rice likewise increases.

I used to think that we should expect of presidents of philosophical associations that they offer us a few pithy comments on the nature of the universe.

Kant is well known as the philosopher who spent his life hunting for a prioris, philosophically identifiable characteristics of the make-up of human beings. These characteristics are species-universal, and are necessary presuppositions of the possibility of the success of various kinds of cognitive and cultural strategies. Kant bagged some big game. Space, time and the categories are a priori conditions of the possibility of human cognition. God, freedom and immortality are a priori conditions of the possibility of morality. The sensus communis is the a priori condition of the possibility of the universalization of judgments of taste. The hard-won trophies are presuppositions of possibilities. Once they were thought to be properties of a universe well ordered by a substantive god. No longer. Now we must look upon them as entrenched contributions of what it is to be human, as preconditions of human potentialities.

For many of us nurtured in idealist ways inclining us to unwavering acceptance of Kantian principles, 1951 was a bad year. We read in Reichenbach's The Rise of Saientifio Philosophy of the “disintegration of the synthetic a priori”. Kant had taught us that there are very general principles—each one connected to a primal category of thought—that are necessary in the formation of mathematics and physics and are expressible in nonanalytic propositions. However, since Kant's death in 1804 both mathematics and physics have developed revolutionary traits: non-euclidian geometries, new developments in symbolic logic, relativity physics, and finally, quantum mechanics, sealed the negative fate of Kant's high principles. Henceforth we must accept that there are no non-empty claims about reality that can be counted as necessary or indispensable to mathematics and science.

Professor Marcucci's book on Whewell [6] is a comprehensive expository treatment of Whewell's philosophy of science. The work contains chapters on Whewell's theory of ideas, the fundamental principles of his philosophy of science, his views on mathematics and mechanics, and on his philosophy of induction and philosophy of discovery. In addition there is a chapter on the English reception of Whewell's thought. Professor Marcucci's notes are rich, both in references to Whewell's many critics and to nearly all of the extant literature on Whewell. Indeed, no full study of Whewell has as yet appeared that makes better or more extensive use of all the relevant literature on Whewell.

Central to Paul K. Feyerabend's philosophy of science are two theses: (1) there is no standard observation language available to science; instead, observability is to be viewed as a pragmatic matter; and (2) when considering questions of empirical significance and experimental test, the methodological unit of science is a set of inconsistent theories. I argue that the pragmatic theory of observation by itself decides neither for nor against any particular specification of meaning for an observation language; and that Feyerabend's position provides no decision procedure when two contending theories share no terms having the same meaning, and thus cannot be said to be logically incompatible. Also, Feyerabend's insistence upon falsification will force him to admit that there are relatively permanent facts available to all theories, or to abandon the idea of test as falsification and to conclude that scientific theories can only be accepted or rejected on the basis of non-evidential considerations.

In a recent paper,[3], Harold T. Walsh has argued that (1) Whewell's commentators have in the past misunderstood his use of “necessary,” that (2) Whewell's theory of necessary truth developed only gradually through thirty years of scholarly activity, finally finding a “mature” expression in Philosophy of Discovery, published in 1860, and that (3) a proper understanding of Whewell's “mature” theory of necessary truth leads to a fundamental re-interpretation of the nature of the Ideas and of their role in scientific systems—that the meaning of “necessity” as Whewell expresses it in Philosophy of Discovery leads, in short, to a new and more illuminating reading of his philosophy of inductive science. It is my view that the three propositions asserting Walsh's view are incorrect, expecially the two important and crucial ones (2) and (3). In what follows, I shall state what seem to me to be the grounds for rejecting Walsh's view that Whewell's theory of necessity was not arrived at before 1860, and hence for rejecting his interpretation of some basic aspects of Whewell's philosophy of science.