Chapter 6 covers the post-uprisings period. Whatever the poor harvest in terms of democratic advances nine years later, many Arab states have witnessed an unprecedented wave of changes and reactions (counterrevolutionary moves) similar in importance to the revolutions of the 1950s–1960s. The term revolution (thawra) was first widely used, with the Tocquevillian caveat about the relevance of the state and the power structures of old regimes both for the breakdown and then regime re-formation – and the effect of huge social mobilization should not be assessed only with the notion of a unified outcome (success or failure) at the macro-level in the short term. This chapter shows the tentative deployment of the military's institutional power with different outcomes. Notwithstanding the enduring Tunisian exception and the case of full civil war in Syria, the picture is mixed with reinforced militarism in Egypt, attempts elsewhere in a context of acute threats and boiling regional context, yet with inherent weaknesses and risks of fragmentation.

Chapter 4 deals with monarchical armies, as these allegedly specific cases are usually less addressed in studies about Arab militaries. It also delves into differences within the monarchies, with Jordan, Morocco and Oman closer to the model of professional/institutionalized Arab armies (with these terms strongly qualified), in contrast to the specific militaries of the Gulf oil states, characterized with overspending in some dimensions (infrastructure and equipment), the maintenance of an understaffed (yet well-paid and “cocooned”) army and the overreliance on the American (or Western) security alliance. It shows that monarchies are not so alien to the military, though they maintain a specific composition. Whatever the differences (and violent encounters) with republics in their trajectory of political development in the two post-independence decades, both types of regimes, monarchies as well as republics, converged in similar authoritarian control after the 1970s. And this chapter also explores a new sense of military assertiveness after 2011 in the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

A cursory look at the recent stage of Arab politics will easily vindicate a return to the study of the military. In Egypt in 2011, the fall of Mubarak brought the army back into politics in the shape of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces; then in 2013, after an unprecedented one-year period of civilian rule, the military toppled President Morsi; since then, President/Field Marshal al-Sisi has consolidated – and even increased to an unprecedented level – the army’s role in the governance of the country. In Libya after the fall of Qaddafi through civil war, an ensuing power struggle opened up between, on the one hand, rising new elites calling themselves “revolutionaries,” namely, civilians turned militia commanders and specifically integrated in the rebuilt security sector, and on the other hand, some officers from Qaddafi’s former army, especially in the East (Cyrenaica).

In Chapter 2, I argue that military politics was laid down in a renewed pattern after the 1970s under enduring authoritarian regimes that were characterized as “demilitarized” or “civilianized.” In most cases, officers did not rule (or did not want to rule) but one of them was at the helm. I argue that Arab armies were state institutions of great importance, at least compared with other “ghost” or “void” institutional dynamics in Arab polities, and especially as the holders of last-resort heavy coercion. The creation and management of political quietism within armies was a key issue for such authoritarian regimes. This imperative of control was pushed to the limit in some cases: with the “social engineering” in the officer corps by Hafez al-Assad, or with the hijacking of the Yemeni military by Ali Abdallah Saleh, after the systemic positioning of close relatives (sons, half-brothers, nephews) in command posts. In the eclectic Libyan case, Qaddafi, though an officer, distrusted the army and spent decades tearing it apart. Conversely, the tradition of civilian control endured in Tunisia from Bourguiba to Ben Ali, though the latter was an army officer, quickly turned “securocrat.”

Military interventions in politics and more generally military roles in the Arab World are a multifaceted rather than mono-causal phenomenon. The historical journey of this book through my sample of countries aims at promoting a more grounded view of Arab armies. Contrary to the literature that has flourished after 2011, my view of the military is not that of a mere state institution being determined by its internal dynamics (rules, doctrine, culture, etc.) and its political, social, cultural and economic environment, along with some regional and international factors; and then, prompted by an event it did not desire, it suddenly jumped into politics in 2011 with various consequences.

Chapter 5 focuses on the 2011 uprisings. In the complex interplay of factors involved, armies have played a crucial role, either by keeping cohesive or by disappearing or by fracturing. When the Ben Ali system crumbled, the small Tunisian military revealed itself as the only institution keeping afloat, until other dynamics of civil society took back the upper hand in channeling political transition. The veiled and unspoken power of the armed forces in the Egyptian political system came back to open light and might. The Yemeni model of enduring authoritarian power was severely shaken by the uprising that also unleashed parallel power struggles. The 2011 transition revealed how crucial the Libyan army was, with its specificities, furthermore in a transition eased out by an eight-month civil war and international intervention. The use (and abuse) of the Syrian army was pushed further as it was pulled by the (Bashar al-Assad) regime into heavy-handed repression then full-scale civil war.

Chapter 1 starts with a critical juncture that installed a new pattern with the political surge of armies in many Arab states. Newly independent states engaged in the complex task of building their armed forces, also as a symbol of their newly gained sovereignty. During this foundational period, the complex processes of nation- and state-building went hand in hand with the politicization of the officer corps so that the army was propelled as the founder of new, postcolonial political orders and as a specific incubator, in control of real power and endowed with huge power resources. Within this general trend, some militaries were much more submitted to social trends and penetration by societies in the form of ethno-confessional or tribal dimensions, when compared with the relative closure of the Egyptian armed forces to society and its dynamics. Rather than their exhaustion in the framework of national armies, subsequent political developments witnessed their enhancement, as exemplified by Syria and Yemen. And, in this overall picture of heightened militarization in the Arab World, Tunisia appeared as the negative and exceptional case with its armed forces remaining a subservient part of the (civilian) Tunisian state and regime alike.

In Chapter 3, I specify the status of armies under authoritarian regimes beyond their proximity to regimes. I want to offer a better understanding of what is distinctive about the armed forces in Arab authoritarian regimes. First, in most cases, armies have been huge bureaucratic actors seated in the state, living in and often above the state. Second and contra, in most cases, armies have kept some relations with their respective societies at least through the institution of (more-or-less filtered) conscription, also an important source of legitimacy. Third, armies have been budget-hungry actors, whose expenses have often been covered with access to foreign military aid. And fourth, in some cases and with different overtones from Egypt to Syria, armies have become powerful economic actors in the (civilian) economy.

Abstract

The Arab world is in the midst of a process of change whose main engine are mobilized societies against authoritarian rule. Yet, the military has played a decisive role in the course of uprisings, easing transitions (Egypt, Tunisia), imploding (Libya), repressing (Bahrain), or fracturing (Yemen, presumably Syria). This is no surprise as the military was an essential, but very specific, part of Arab authoritarian regimes. In the 1950s–1960s, the military acted as modernizers with a nationalist vision. In 2011–2012, the military was unwilling to take power. The military has been propelled into politics, either remaining the only institution or as an instrument of repression. I assess the military’s reactions to the mass uprisings and the regime’s call for heavy repression. After regime change, the nature and course of transition is once again heavily dependent on the actions of the various militaries or their remnants when they have fractured.

Massive societal uprisings (thawra) against authoritarian rule in 2011 came as a surprise to regimes as well as outside observers in the ‘quiet landscape’ of persistent authoritarian rule in the Middle East (dubbed ‘the Arab exception’). The strength of active and young societies and their ability to present their demands in forceful mobilizations calling for dignity (karama), humanity (insaniyya), and liberty (huriyya) while pouring into symbolic public spaces was the crux of the Arab uprisings. Nevertheless, armies have played the role of midwife for transitions in Tunisia and Egypt where the military refused to shoot at protesters, thereby easing the end of both regimes. The army was involved in repression in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. In Libya, the army imploded in the first ‘days of anger’, and then became engaged in a civil war. In addition to the essential role of autonomous societal mobilizations, the role of the military is absolutely critical in all cases.