The research of Lindenberger, Brehmer, Kliegl and Baltes into the cognitive decline-compensating effects of expertise is based on the difference between fluid and crystallized intelligence. While fluid intelligence measures such as speed and capacity are more biologically determined and thus decline with age, crystallized intelligence measures encompass culture-based skills and factual knowledge, and are more resilient to ageing-induced decline. Would the graphic expertise of professional older designers protect them against cognitive decline compared to young designers and two age- and intelligence-matched control groups? This was tested in a training study using the Method of Loci where visualization and imagery is essential, as recall of words is cued by previously associated landmarks. As expected, graphic designers showed better performance on spatial tests than controls, but this was even more pronounced in the older group, where the designers had consistently higher scores than their age peers. While older graphic designers could not match the performance of the young groups, they did fare better than their age-matched controls in the post-training Method of Loci memory assessment. It is concluded that although graphic expertise could not entirely compensate for the biologically determined reduction in fluid intelligence, there was a positive effect on episodic memory.

cognitive functioning in later periods of the adult lifespan is characterized by a dynamic interdependence between knowledge-related increments and senescent declines. To capture this interdependence, two-component models of cognition separate a biology-based component from a culture-based component of intellectual functioning (e.g. Baltes, 1987; Cattell, 1971).

As described in Chapters 1, this book is the outgrowth of the desire to generate a theoretical orientation in which simple models of unidirectional determinism in regard to human behavior and human development, whether gene, brain, behavior, or culture driven, are laid to rest. A vibrant counterdose of interactionism seemed especially necessary in light of recent public discussions in Germany, much stimulated by noted neuroscientists, about the unquestionable dominance of the brain in the determination of behavior and individual action. We believed that this seeming movement toward reductionistic determinism, stemming in part from the justifiable excitement associated with new methods of neuroscience, was cause for concern. Of course, there were many important forerunners to our general theoretical orientation. Nonetheless, we judged that strengthening a more dynamic and interactionist conception of the nature of human behavior and the role of culture in co-constructing the brain and behavior was the call of the times.

Our first step was to have discussions among the three editors and a few close colleagues, such as Ulman Lindenberger and Shu-Chen Li. Subsequently, we planned a conference to examine the basic rationale and enrich its conceptual framework. Specifically, the goal was to bring noted scholars together, who, as a collective, would be prepared to activate and orchestrate a position where the various participating elements – the genome, the brain, behavior, the physical environment, and culture – were seen as somewhat independent agents that influence each other in pervasive, deep, and cumulative ways.

The main objective of this book is to advance research and theory in the study of brain–culture relationships. Contentwise, our primary arena is the study of human behavior, in general, and human development, in particular. When speaking of human development, we refer to the view that human development is a lifelong process, extending from conception into old age. When we speak of culture in this context, we use it in its most general sense and mean to include all aspects of the environment – physical, material, social, and symbolic.

On the one hand, we note the already existing and recently strengthened connections between researchers and scholars in the neuro, behavioral, social, and cultural sciences that give testimony to a new level of “interdisiplinarity.” It is increasingly recognized that such collaborative work, aimed at a more explicit treatment of the brain–culture interface, is necessary to better understand the interactive systems that shape the human mind and its development.

On the other hand, we also suggest that there are lacunae or misunderstandings in recognizing the full reciprocal nature of the brain–culture interaction. One example is the occasionally high emphasis that brain researchers place on brain determinism. A similar one-sidedness exists among some social scientists when they engage themselves in demonstrating the exclusive role of social-cultural environmental conditions. To counteract such lacunae or one-sided perspectives, we introduce a new “metatheoretical” paradigm as a guiding principle. This is the principle of developmental biocultural co-constructivism.