Altered basaltic tephra from Haleakala, Maui, are characterized using multiple techniques in order to identify the minerals formed under a variety of conditions and to understand the soil formation processes here. We collected samples that are representative of typical bulk weathered material in the crater, as well as solfataric alteration in a hydrothermal environment. For this study X-ray diffraction, electron probe microanalysis, scanning electron microscopy and transmission electron microscopy are coupled with spectroscopic techniques including Mössbauer, visible-infrared reflectance, transmission infrared, and thermal infrared emission spectroscopies to analyze these samples. The unaltered tephra are composed of feldspar, glass, pyroxene and olivine. Observed alteration products include Fe oxides, phyllosilicates and sulfates, as well as SAED amorphous Al-Si-bearing material. These samples are potential analogs for altered volcanic material on Mars as the pedogenic influences and contact with plants and animals are minimal. Results from this study may help to determine spectral signatures of these samples that could be used for identification on Mars of the minerals observed here.

While leaders in many times and places from ancient Greece to today have been called to account, it has been claimed that leaders in ancient Athens were called to account more than any other group in history. This paper surveys the distinctive ways in which Athenian accountability procedures gave the democratic people as a whole a meaningful voice in defining, revealing, and judging the misuse of office, and in holding every single official regularly and personally accountable for their use of their powers. By then assessing a drastic case of unaccountability in a certain moment of Athenian history – the rule of the Thirty in 404–403 BCE – and how accountability was ultimately imposed on them, the paper concludes with thoughts about what might deepen and restore trust in the accountability of public officials today.

Can ordinary citizens in a democracy evaluate the claims of scientific experts? While a definitive answer must be case by case, some scholars have offered sharply opposed general answers: a skeptical “no” (e.g. Scott Brewer) versus an optimistic “yes, no problem” (e.g. Elizabeth Anderson). The article addresses this basic conflict, arguing that a satisfactory answer requires a first-order engagement in judging the claims of experts which both skeptics and optimists rule out in taking the issue to be one of second-order assessments only. Having argued that such first-order judgments are necessary, it then considers how they are possible, outlining a range of practices and virtues that can inform their success and likelihood, and drawing throughout on ancient Greek insights as well as contemporary social psychology and sociology of knowledge. In conclusion the ethics of democratic judgment so developed is applied to the dramatic conviction of the members of an Italian scientific risk commission in L'Aquila.