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23 results

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  • RESISTING RESISTING EXTERNALISM
  • Chris Buford, Anthony Brueckner
  • Journal: Episteme / Volume 11 / Issue 1 / March 2014
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 November 2013, pp. 27-33
  • View abstract

    In “Externalism Resisted,” Jonathan Vogel addresses some important, foundational questions about the nature of justification. Vogel's focus is on Ernest Sosa's case against internalism about justification in Epistemic Justification. We defend Sosa against criticism leveled by Vogel. We also question whether Vogel himself can accept what he labels the connection thesis, a thesis that figures prominently in his arguments against Sosa.

  • Chapter 13 - Roush on knowledge:
  • from Part IV - Sensitivity without subjunctives
  • Edited by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  • Book: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
  • Published online: 05 September 2012
  • Print publication: 02 August 2012, pp 229-241
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter then explores the reasons view and shows how it can account for some of the cases that are troublesome for the etiology view. There are many well-discussed and widely accepted counterexamples in the literature for each of the etiology views, with the exception of the virtue-views because those views are still relatively new.
Debating Self-Knowledge
  • Debating Self-Knowledge
  • Anthony Brueckner, Gary Ebbs
  • Published online: 05 July 2012
  • Print publication: 21 June 2012
  • View description
    Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.

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