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Objectives: The aim of this study was to investigate alterations in functional connectivity, white matter integrity, and cognitive abilities due to sports-related concussion (SRC) in adolescents using a prospective longitudinal design. Methods: We assessed male high school football players (ages 14–18) with (n=16) and without (n=12) SRC using complementary resting state functional MRI (rs-fMRI) and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) along with cognitive performance using the Immediate Post-Concussive Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT). We assessed both changes at the acute phase (<7 days post-SRC) and at 21 days later, as well as, differences between athletes with SRC and age- and team-matched control athletes. Results: The results revealed rs-fMRI hyperconnectivity within posterior brain regions (e.g., precuneus and cerebellum), and hypoconnectivity in more anterior areas (e.g., inferior and middle frontal gyri) when comparing SRC group to control group acutely. Performance on the ImPACT (visual/verbal memory composites) was correlated with resting state network connectivity at both time points. DTI results revealed altered diffusion in the SRC group along a segment of the corticospinal tract and the superior longitudinal fasciculus in the acute phase of SRC. No differences between the SRC group and control group were seen at follow-up imaging. Conclusions: Acute effects of SRC are associated with both hyperconnectivity and hypoconnectivity, with disruption of white matter integrity. In addition, acute memory performance was most sensitive to these changes. After 21 days, adolescents with SRC returned to baseline performance, although chronic hyperconnectivity of these regions could place these adolescents at greater risk for secondary neuropathological changes, necessitating future follow-up. (JINS, 2018, 24, 781–792)
This chapter focuses at the more specific matter of whether there is reason to be theoretically rational. It argues that there is very strong reason to be theoretically rational. Unfortunately, answering the question about theoretical rationality does not settle questions about the normativity of practical rationality, but the chapter outlines in a speculative way how the considerations raised in favor of the normativity of theoretical rationality might be used to show that the requirements of practical rationality are normative. The use of wide-scope oughts, or perhaps wide-scope reasons, in giving an account of rational requirements is important for any view that holds that rational requirements are normative. The initial error is in thinking that rational requirements are conceptually identical to normative requirements. The truth of the particular normative requirement is, like any other ought, determined by the various features of the world on which normativity is dependent.
This book contains a collection of new papers on the topic of reasons for belief, sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘theoretical reasons’. The papers in this volume address two broad themes: the nature of reasons for belief and the application of reasons for belief to other traditional problems in epistemology. The choice of these two themes reflects the rationale for putting together this volume.
For a period of roughly 35 years, practical philosophers have been appealing to reasons to do ever more work in their theorizing. Early debates in practical philosophy posed the question of whether one could have normative reasons for action – considerations that count in favour of an agent's performing a particular action or actions – that were disconnected from an agent's own motivations. Soon the value of thinking of broader problems in ethics in terms of reasons became apparent, and now appeals to reasons populate debates across normative ethics and metaethics alike. Reasons became a kind of common currency for consideration of the normative issues in practical philosophy.
Like those in ethics and other areas of practical philosophy, many of the problems studied in epistemology are also normative. Epistemologists have traditionally examined these problems through discussions of justification and warrant. Increasingly, however, philosophers interested in the problems of normative epistemology have appealed to reasons both to help explicate justification, warrant, and related concepts, and to address independently other concerns in epistemology.
Over the last three decades, practical philosophy has increasingly looked at, and become dependent upon, the concept of normative reasons for actions, and action-related propositional attitudes. The concept gradually came into prominence in a series of classic treatments in the late seventies and early eighties and has since then become the focal point and organizing concept for a vast array of work in both ethics and the philosophy of mind and action. The core of the concept is a simple one: normative reasons are facts that count in favor of some action or attitude; they are the facts that determine whether or not an agent ought to do something, or adopt some attitude. As such, normative reasons are often thought to be the most fundamental concept relevant to understanding rationality, which, on this view, is the capacity to recognize and respond to reasons in appropriate ways. The link to rationality means that normative reasons not only determine what ought to be done; at least sometimes, they also play the role of explaining why an agent in fact acted or thought as she did.
Even if there is broad agreement among philosophers on these fundamental features of reasons, a detailed understanding of reasons is still subject to controversy. What kinds of facts can act as reasons? Are they restricted to representational states such as beliefs or desires, or can non-mental states of affairs act as reasons as well?
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
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