Plato's antidemocratic theory of social justice is instructive once we
distinguish between the abstract parts of his theory and the empirical or
other assumptions he uses in applying that theory. His application may
have contained empirical mistakes, and it may have been burdened too much
with a prolific metaphysics and a demanding epistemology. An attempt is
made to look at his theory of social justice in imaginary isolation from
empirical mistakes and from his metaphysics and epistemology. It is then
argued that some of Plato's proposals and criticisms of democracy are well
worth our attention, especially in the case of governing. His attempt to
separate ruling and wealth and to establish economic floors and ceilings
for his ideal city seems especially instructive in view of problems in
these areas that modern democracies have experienced. Isolating his theory
of social justice from his epistemology and metaphysics may be more
problematic. Still, Plato's insistence that superior wisdom is the central
virtue of rulers is instructive, and in this respect some modern defenders
of democratic justice, such as J. S. Mill and John Rawls, have leaned some
in Plato's direction. Finally, Plato's criticism of democratic free choice
of occupation is less persuasive.