South Sudan is in a unique combination of (post)-conflict reconstruction and the
birth of a new state in which old policies are re-activated and new policies
introduced. By looking at three case-studies of taxation and private sector
regulation reforms, the paper will show how the overlapping and often
contradictory regulatory frameworks of the state provide the setting for
bricolage strategies by different actors. These actors, and particularly state
officials, rely on a variety of institutional resources to implement, resist or
remake certain regulatory measures. Although the breadth of regulatory measures
has increased exponentially, the institutional corridor – the space
in which bricolage is performed and on which various actors can rely
– remains narrow. This space is contingent on wartime authority
structures, and more particularly pre-existing Sudan's People
Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) power structures, as well as a deep-rooted
resistance to centralised control. Importantly, these regulatory practices are
not fixed: intense periods of rearrangement of the social order or
‘open moments’ may provide a window of opportunity for
regulatory reform.