Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-2pzkn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-01T18:22:26.583Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

10 - State architecture: subsidiarity, devolution, federalism and independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2015

Christopher McCrudden
Affiliation:
Queen's University Belfast
Mark Elliott
Affiliation:
St Catharine's College, Cambridge
David Feldman
Affiliation:
Downing College, Cambridge
Get access

Summary

Introduction

The ‘architecture’ of the United Kingdom state seems quite straightforward. Each of its parts is immensely complicated, of course, but the overall structure is clear, is it not? Governmental power is primarily exercised through a sovereign Parliament sitting at Westminster. A government is formed that is able to command the support of the first chamber (the House of Commons). Parliament has agreed to delegate its sovereign powers both upwards and downwards, with some powers being exercised by European institutions, and other powers distributed (the term used is ‘devolved’) among the nations of the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). So, too, other powers are delegated to regional and local communities through a patchwork of local and municipal government. It is a liberal parliamentary democracy, with the first chamber and each of the other forms of government (national, regional and local) being elected by universal franchise. Judicial oversight seeks to ensure that public bodies (with the notable exception of Parliament) obey the law, which includes protections for civil and political rights.

Looked at this way, the United Kingdom is best described as being a classic unitary state, i.e. a state with a system of government that involves the country being governed as a single entity, with the central government in Westminster being supreme, and with the other tiers of government exercising only those powers that the central government (defined to include legislature, executive and courts) has allowed them to exercise. These tiers of government, whether supranational or devolved, are ultimately the creatures of the central government, and will be created and abolished, and their powers broadened and narrowed, by the central government. A unitary state, like the United Kingdom, can be contrasted with a federal state, such as the United States or Germany, in which the sovereign power is shared between the federal government and the states. Unlike several continental European states, like France, the United Kingdom did not arise out of the Jacobin model stemming from the French Revolution and Napoleon, and is thus not based on a strong ideology.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bell, C., ‘Constitutional Transitions: The Peculiarities of the British and the Politics of Comparison’ [2014] Public Law446
Choudhry, S. and Hume, N., ‘Federalism, devolution and secession: from classical to post-conflict federalism’ in Ginsburg, T. and Dixon, R., Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011)Google Scholar
Hatfield, B., ‘Devolution: a national conversation?’ in Jowell, J. and Oliver, D. (eds.), The Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), th edn.Google Scholar
Mabry, T., McGarry, J., Moore, M., and O'Leary, B. (eds.), Divided Nations and European Integration (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacCormack, N., Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)Google Scholar
MacCormick, N., ‘The English Constitution, the British State, and the Scottish Anomaly’ (1998) 101 Proceedings of the British Academy289Google Scholar
McCrudden, C., ‘Northern Ireland and the British Constitution since the Belfast Agreement’ in Jowell, J. and Oliver, D. (eds.), The Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), th edn.Google Scholar
McCrudden, C., ‘Using Comparative Constitutionalism in Human Rights Discourse: Ireland's Past and Scotland's Future’ (2013) 17 Edinburgh Law Review314CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×