The Muslim minorities in mainland Southeast Asia, specifcally Indochina, are a small, marginal, and often forgotten comunities, if compared to the Muslim minorities in maritime Southeast Asia. Muslims constitute about 5 per cent in Myanmar (Burma), 4 per cent in Cambodia (Kampuchea) and a mere 1 per cent in Vietnam and Laos. Given their relatively small size and their lack of integration with maritime Southeast Asia, very little is known about their situation. However, some rudimentary statistical information is available, especially with regard to Muslim institutions such as mosques, madrasahs and Muslim organizations in these four countries.

In many ways, though, the problems confronting the Indochinese Muslim community are not unique but are common among minority populations in many less developed countries. Unlike the past, where minority antagonism against the State was mostly associated with their attraction to the Marxist ideology of class struggle, today, arguably, the roots of the surge for ethno-religious identity seem to be due more to economic causes. Hence, in assessing the plight of Muslim minorities in Indochina, rather than focusing on identity politics per se, which often hinge on issues of class, primordialism, and marginalization of minorities from the mainstream body politic, scholars have paid greater attention to the perennial issue of economic malaise in general, and economic deprivation in particular. Obviously, from the State perspective, the “minority problem” cannot be brushed aside since its resolution is critical for national integration. States usually employ two principal strategies in dealing with their minorities — assimilation and accommodation. Insofar as the Indo-chinese states are concerned, by and large, it appears that their elites prefer the former (Kettani 1986; Murshida 2006; Taouti 1982).

In studying the case of Muslim minorities in these states, perhaps there is merit to refer to some theoretical models that explain the causes of ethno-religious tension and how States manage such tensions. Two of these are the “conflict spiral” and the “instrumentalist” models, which our case studies will soon illustrate.