Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Theories of Naval Power: A. T. Mahan and the Naval History of Medieval and Renaissance Europe
- I Northern Europe
- II Southern Europe
- Byzantium and the Sea: Byzantine Fleets and the History of the Empire in the Age of the Macedonian Emperors, c.900–1025 CE
- Iberian Naval Power, 1000–1650
- Venice, Genoa and Control of the Seas in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
- Genoese Naval Forces in the Mediterranean during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries
- An Exemplary Maritime Republic: Venice at the End of the Middle Ages
- III Sixteenth and Early-Seventeenth-Century Europe
- Conclusion: Toward a History of Medieval Sea Power
- Index
- Titles in the series
Genoese Naval Forces in the Mediterranean during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries
from II - Southern Europe
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of illustrations
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Theories of Naval Power: A. T. Mahan and the Naval History of Medieval and Renaissance Europe
- I Northern Europe
- II Southern Europe
- Byzantium and the Sea: Byzantine Fleets and the History of the Empire in the Age of the Macedonian Emperors, c.900–1025 CE
- Iberian Naval Power, 1000–1650
- Venice, Genoa and Control of the Seas in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
- Genoese Naval Forces in the Mediterranean during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries
- An Exemplary Maritime Republic: Venice at the End of the Middle Ages
- III Sixteenth and Early-Seventeenth-Century Europe
- Conclusion: Toward a History of Medieval Sea Power
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
A REPUBLIC that does not possess the art of war is deprived of that which makes it a republic. Thus spoke Doge Matteo Senarega, at the end of the sixteenth century, in a debate that involved all the ruling groups of Genoa at the time. Was it necessary to create a real state fleet, capable of making the power of the Republic respected and of preserving its liberty, or was it better to leave matters in the hands of private ship-owners from whom the state could charter services in case of a foreign threat, imperial naval obligations, or corsairs who dared to attack the vessels of la Superba?
The imbalance between public naval forces and private ones was a constant feature of Genoese history. The galleys of the state counted for little compared to the fleets that the great familial clans could assemble, especially at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Was this a consequence of the Genoese individualism so dear to Roberto Lopez, or was it due to a delayed development toward a modern state, leaving Genoa slow to put into place the means of defence necessary for its survival? To explain the reason for these disproportions it is necessary to determine the importance of Genoese naval forces raised during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is also necessary to evaluate the frequent, often debated, efforts to construct a real state fleet and, finally, to demonstrate the conditions which were required for such efforts to establish a fleet to be realised.
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- Information
- War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance , pp. 137 - 150Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2002