Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-2xdlg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-17T03:36:15.708Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core

Klein on Aristotle on Number

from Discussion

Edward C. Halper
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
Burt Hopkins
Affiliation:
Seattle University
John Drummond
Affiliation:
Fordham University
Get access

Summary

Abstract: Jacob Klein raises two important questions about Aristotle's account of number: (1) How does the intellect come to grasp a sensible as an intelligible unit? (2) What makes a collection of these intelligible units into one number? His answer to both questions is “abstraction.” First, we abstract (or, better, disregard) a thing's sensible characteristics to grasp it as a noetic unit. Second, after counting like things, we again disregard their other characteristics and grasp the group as a noetic entity composed of “pure” units. As Klein explains them, Aristotle's numbers are each “heaps” of counted units; in contrast, each of Plato's numbers is one. This paper argues that Klein is right to understand a noetic unit existing in the sensible entity, but that his answer to the second question is not consonant with Aristotle's insistence that Plato cannot account for the unity of a number, whereas he can. Slightly modifying Klein's analysis, I show that Aristotle's numbers are each one.

Keywords: unity of units in a number; abstraction; Jacob Klein; counting; Aristotle's account of number; Plato's account of number.

Let me begin with a story. The year was 1976, and I was writing a dissertation on Aristotle's Metaphysics. For reasons I can no longer recall, I decided to spend the summer in London working at the British Library, then still located in the British Museum. After some weeks on my own, I began to look around for people who were working in my area.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×