Introduction

This paper deals with the development of two philosophical traditions (i.e. successions of thinkers), namely Nyāya and Bhāṭṭamīmāṃā. Our attempt is to juxtapose the two schools on a specific philosophical problem, to highlight points of contact and departure, and possibly to get a better picture of the evolution of their thought by underlining inherited concepts and mutual influences. In doing so we will show how the representatives of the two streams further explained the original arguments of the sūtras, added new perspectives, and replied to issues raised by opponent schools.

Particularly, our focus is on the defense of the validity (prāmāṇya) of Veda. The reason for this choice is that Veda is held as an autonomous source of information about religious matters by the two schools under exam and is widely accepted in their social context as a source of knowledge. In this sense it constitutes the tradition (i.e. the cultural horizon) of both.

In their bid to defend Veda's validity, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā have also a further purpose (for Nyāya, arguably, the main purpose): justifying the epistemic role of tradition (i.e. word-conveyed knowledge).

In the following pages the different acceptations of the word ‘tradition’—respectively employed, from the strictly grammatical point of view, as a class-noun, a noun denoting a state of affairs, and an action noun—will clearly surface: we are going to talk of traditions that, within the horizon of a cultural tradition, discuss the epistemic role of tradition.