China is today facing a war against drugs, a war that has been threatening the very fabric of the state. The drug threat emanates from multiple sources ranging from states in its periphery, regional criminal networks to domestic actors, such as local triads, which account for the bulk of the production and sale of narcotics in China. As China gradually opens up, the drug problem is becoming increasingly serious and threatens China's progress, especially in the field of health, economy and public security. This development is driven by the rapid economic development and the creation of a strong consumer base in China for narcotics. As seen in Central Asia, Afghanistan and some Southeast Asian states, economies seriously affected by the narcotics trade usually have a worsened health situation with the increase in HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C and other drug related diseases (Swanström and Cornell, 2006, pp. 10–28). There have also been cases of ‘narcotisation’ of states leading to political instability (Cornell, 2006, pp. 37–8; Swanström, 2007). They are usually associated with decreased competitiveness of the national economies as drug related industries offer steady incomes in states with high unemployment and where few opportunities exists for a secure income, at the legitimate market. One of the most problematic effects in such states has been weakening of the state apparatus by the criminal networks that deal with drugs. Such networks thrive in weak states where they exercise control over the political elite or simply become a part of the elite.