The Taliban, like several other Islamist groups, have been a frequent subject of predictable journalistic and academic outpourings often reiterating only a vicious and sexist side of their ideology, which inherently banks on staunch Wahhabi, Salafi and Deobandi postulations. Given the pervasive views on Islam and especially following September 11, such a premise became the dominant and perhaps the only narrative of its type in English and other Western languages. Amidst the longest and the immensely taxing war that more than 30 nations have fought in Afghanistan, any alternative academic or media view of Talibanist views of Islam or their ability to withstand and even embarrass the world's most powerful states has certainly been non-existent. It is only recently that the Taliban have begun to use IT, especially websites, though their usage of mobile phones, pamphleteering and messages through human carriers are still the preferred modus operandi. In addition, sympathetic mosque-based networks and tribal contacts facilitate mutual communications, though their younger supporters in Pakistan and elsewhere have been more IT-savvy than the pioneer generation, who were nevertheless still able to surprise everybody with their rapid mobility, prolonged and even effective campaigns and by their survival against the odds. Soon after September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban were subjected to a ‘hammer-and-anvil policy’ based on being squeezed from all sides. Pakistan, which participated in this policy, carried out several military operations in the FATA in addition to rounding up thousands of Afghan, Pakistani and other international Islamists from across its lands. The suicide bombings in Madrid, Bali and London – other than hundreds of such kamikaze onslaughts in Pakistani and Afghan towns and markets – intensified general hostility towards this militancy, which was causing stupendous civilian losses.