The Arab ‘development’ experience of the last three decades cannot be understood outside a context of de-development. The uprisings that erupted because of misery and repression—and, foremost, because of a crisis of rule by the ruling classes (Gramsci 1971)—notwithstanding, wars, civil wars and the continued Israeli occupation of Palestine characterise the recent history of the region. Instead of mobilising resources for development, the surplus petrodollars of the Gulf states fund the formation of divisive sectarian identities, contribute to wasteful consumption and bolster regression. While there are differences as well as commonalities in Arab development, it is somewhat scholastic to define the various discrete shades of developmental malfunction. Rather, the scope of the research here presented addresses the social relations that repeatedly generate disasters over time. In any case, all Arab countries have fallen short of real development by different degrees. Detailing the minute differences between countries would add little to our understanding of the historical dynamics behind the collapse in development common to all Arab countries; the mere accumulation of such detailed distinctions is a form of empiricism leading to theoretical nihilism. Examining the shared social relationships that shape poor development is a more useful form of analysis, because it allows us to conceptually address the underlying causes.