This book deals with my favourite subject, the principles of cross-border insolvency law. Not only is this a subject of great academic interest, too little dealt with in the literature, but it is also a vital subject for arguing cases in the courts, particularly at the highest level.

Once a case reaches the Supreme Court or CJEU level, there is no binding precedent, and the court is required to consider the subject in the light of the applicable principles. This can be seen in a whole series of CJEU decisions on the EIR, which all stress the cross-border insolvency law principles involved. Professor Bork discusses many of these in detail. Likewise, in the UK Supreme Court, I have seen counsel asked by the judges: ‘What is the principle involved here? ’ In teaching cross-frontier insolvency law as a Visiting Professor in Corporate Insolvency law at Oxford I ask students the same question. They cannot do well by simply telling me the rules – I need to know the underlying principles and not just how they have been applied by the judges, but also how they ought to be applied.

Even at lower court levels, the higher court precedents on cross-border insolvency law often leave much scope for argument and some scope for the exercise of discretion. A knowledge of and reference to applicable principles is essential for lower court judges to be able to decide wisely and well. The consideration of principles and their application is no simple matter.

As Professor Bork explains, potentially applicable principles often conflict. The CJEU is good at pointing to the principles it uses to decide cases, but is elusive in explaining how it has resolved conflicting principles and how a court decides to give more weight to one principle than another. Here the courts can get into dangerous territory, as the respective weight to be given to principles can involve politically charged issues such as employment protection.

Professor Bork sensibly stays clear of taking either a conservative or socialist standpoint. However, he does implicitly side with those of us who take the view that law is not merely a system of rules but involves the application of principles.