The moral significance of social networking technologies can only be understood once they are uncoupled from the political significance with which they have long been described. The focus on the political significance of social networking technologies is not surprising. Social networking technologies are viewed as fundamental to the expression of our First Amendment rights and liberties in cyberspace just as often as they are characterized as a threat to them. There is support for both contentions. On the one hand, incidences of cyber harassment, cyber stalking, revenge porn, and cyber bullying are on the increase as the pace of our online interactions escalates. Citron describes one such instance with long- lasting consequences

There is little disagreement over the fact that our use of social networking technologies results in some harmful behavior. The conflict is how to best regulate against the more damaging online activities without undermining the principles of the First Amendment, including free speech, freedom of association, and anonymity. This is the contention of those like Gabriella Coleman, for example, who defend any online behavior, even if harmful or disruptive, as the continuation of an American tradition in cyberspace. She suggests those who are critical of some of the more injurious communications should not focus our attention on “a putatively homogeneous set of norms, values, and practices” to judge the activities. She encourages us to instead consider that these online activities evoke broader themes consistent with our political sense of right and good, including free speech, meritocracy, privacy, and the power of the individual, all of which represent “reworked liberal ideals which ultimately create a diverse but related set of expressions concerning selfhood, property, privacy, labor, and creativity” (Coleman and Golub, 2008, p. 267).