Can we have a theoretical framework to systematize empirical facts of macrosystems without referring to microscopic details?

What is Phenomenology?

A phenomenological description of macrosystems is a description solely in terms of quantities that may be observed, controlled, and described at the macroscopic scale. If we could make a closed (complete) system of theory in terms of such quantities, the result is called phenomenology.

The phenomenology of macroscopic systems in equilibrium (see 12.2) we now have is called thermodynamics. The reader must clearly recognize that, in contrast to (the supposedly more fundamental) statistical mechanics, thermodynamics survived the quantum revolution unscathed; and it actually helped launch the revolution. Quantum mechanics has no problem with thermodynamics (for now), but even if quantum mechanics is replaced by something else in the future, thermodynamics will remain intact.

In physics, “phenomenology” has not necessarily been respected; it could almost be a pejorative (e.g., in high-energy physics). However, notice that when underlying microscopic descriptions are impossible or only approximate, phenomenology may be the only realistic rational means for human beings to grasp the world. As we will see soon, thermodynamics correctly captures a certain universal feature of the macroscopic world which is quite insensitive to the microscopic details. A phenomenology is not an approximate way to understand the world nor a crude version of something more accurate; thermodynamics is not an approximation to a certain more advanced and accurate theory. Perhaps, intelligent beings could emerge only in such worlds that allow phenomenological descriptions.

However, one may well claim that as an empirical science, quantum mechanics is much more precisely validated than thermodynamics.