Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-mwx4w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-26T23:53:15.260Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

37 - Designing the US Incentive Auction

from Part VI - Secondary Markets and Exchanges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2017

Paul R. Milgrom
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Ilya R. Segal
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Martin Bichler
Affiliation:
Technische Universität München
Jacob K. Goeree
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, Sydney
Get access

Summary

The US government recently completed a new kind of double auction, which aquired television broadcast rights from current TV broadcasters and sold mobile broadband licenses. Known as the “incentive auction” because it was intended to create an incentive for TV broadcasters to relinquish their licenses, this auction involved tens of billions of dollars of payments and determined an allocation that satisfies millions of interference constraints. In this paper, we describe why the problem is so complex, outline the auction's final design adopted by the Federal Communication Commission, and describe how this design overcame the novel challenges that the FCC faced.

Background and Challenges

The incentive auction was mandated by an act of Congress in February 2012. In the years since the introduction of the iPhone, iPad, and similar devices, there has been explosive growth in the demand for broadband services and the spectrum it uses. The US government responded with its National Broadband Plan, which aims tomakemore spectrum available for broadband services partly by clearing some bands currently in other uses. Some spectrum used for UHF television broadcasts was very well suited to broadband. Since 90% of US households had access to cable or satellite television, over-the-air broadcasting appeared to be less important than in an earlier era. Also, the switch to digital TV signals made it possible to transmit several standard-definition signals using a single TV channel.

The Roles of Government and Auction

Economists naturally ask: Why not just rely on private transactions to shift spectrum resources to their most valuable uses? Why is value added by a government intervention?

The answer is that spectrum reallocation has the characteristics of a collective action problem. In order to use spectrum most effectively, the frequencies used for TV broadcasting need to be nearly the same across the whole country and the wireless broadband uses must be separated from TV frequencies and coordinated to avoid unacceptable interference between uplink and downlink uses.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ausubel, L. 2004. “An Efficient Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects,” American EconomicReview 94(5), 1452–1475.Google Scholar
Ausubel, L. and Milgrom, P. 2002. “Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,” Frontiers of TheoreticalEconomics 1(1).Google Scholar
Bikhchandani, S., de Vries, S., Schummer, J., and Vohra, R. 2011. “An Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Selling Bases of a Matroid,” Operations Research 59(2), 400–413.Google Scholar
Frechette, A., Newman, N., and Leyton-Brown K.; 2015. “Solving the Station Repacking Problem,” International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).Google Scholar
Federal Communication Commission 2015. “Public Notice 1578: Broadcast Incentive Auction Scheduled To Begin on March 29, 2016: Procedures for Competitive Bidding In Auction 1000, Including Initial Clearing Target Determination, Qualifying To Bid, And Bidding in Auctions 1001 (Reverse) and 1002 (Forward),” AU Docket No. 14-252, GN Docket No. 12-268, WT Docket No. 12-269, MB Docket No. 15-146.
Li, S. 2017. “Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,” SSRN working paper.
Milgrom, P. and Weber, R. 1982. “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica 50(5), 1089–1122.Google Scholar
Milgrom, P. and Segal, I. 2017. “Deferred Acceptance Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation,” Stanford University working paper.
Milgrom, P.,Ausubel, L., Levin, J., and Segal, I. 2012. “Appendix C: Incentive Auction Rules Option and Discussion,” http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-118A2.pdf.

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×