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23 - The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture

from Part III - Alternative Auction Designs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2017

Charles R. Plott
Affiliation:
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology
Hsing Yang Lee
Affiliation:
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology
Travis Maron
Affiliation:
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology
Martin Bichler
Affiliation:
Technische Universität München
Jacob K. Goeree
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, Sydney
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Summary

Introduction and Background

The history of the continuous combinatorial auction marks the evolution of the mechanism. The concept of a combinatorial auction is due to Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982) who were motivated by the use of simultaneous ascending price auctions to allocate landing rights (Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1979 and subsequently published in 1989)). The ideas were generalized by Banks, Ledyard, and Porter (1989) to include the concept of a “standby queue” which serves a function similar to non-winning bids in the current system.

The first example of a continuous combinatorial auction is found at Brewer and Plott (1996). They demonstrate that representations in terms of binary confects of packages afford both the flexibility for widespread application and the computational speed required to support the auction. This early mechanism depended heavily on the existence of a fixed set of packages on which bids could be placed. The computer could quickly compute non-intersecting packages that maximized the value of the sale and permitted the auction to proceed as a type of continuous, simultaneous, ascending price auction. The packages played the role of items on which bids were placed. The nonintersecting packages that produced the most revenue from the auction were declared the leading bids at each instant of time. That first mechanism was followed by slight generalization to a procurement problem in which the buyer organized sellers to minimize procurement cost and sellers could offer endogenous packages. The organization was a simultaneous, decreasing price auction.

In the 1990s, the FCC was considering the adoption of a combinatorial auction as a replacement for the simultaneous, rounds-based, ascending price auction that the FCC had used to auction parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. The initial research focused on a hybrid process that consisted of rounds followed by a continuous phase. (See the report of Charles R. Plott, FCC Why River Conference, May 5–7, 2000). Experiments with the hybrid revealed that, that most of the adjustment and efficiently came from the continuous phase. That discovery led to the study of combinatorial auctions that operated only in continuous time.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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References

Banks, J.S., J. O., Ledyard, and D. P., Porter, (1989). “Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach”. Rand Journal of Economics 20 (1):1–25.Google Scholar
Brewer, Paul J. and Charles R., Plott, (1996). “ABinary ConflictAscending Price (BICAP) Mechanism for the Decentralized Allocation of the Right to Use Railroad Tracks,” International Journal ofIndustrial Organization, 14:857–886.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brewer, Paul J. and Charles R., Plott, (2002). “A Decentralized, Smart Market Solution to a Class of Back-haul Transport Problems: Concept and Experimental Testbeds”, Interfaces, 32 (5):13–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grether, David, R., Mark Isaac, and Charles R., Plott, “Alternative Methods of Allocating Airport Slots: Performance and Evaluation,” Paper prepared for the Civil Aeronautics Board. Pasadena: Polinomics Research Laboratories I.c., 1979.
Grether, David M., R., Mark Isaac, and Charles R., Plott, The Allocation of Scarce Resources: ExperimentalEconomics and the Problem of Allocating Airport Slots, Westview Press Underground Classics in Economics series, 1989.
Plott, Charles R., “A Combinatorial Auction Designed for the Federal Communications Commission”, presented at the Combinatorial Auction Conference 5/18/2000. FCC, Why River Conference.Google Scholar
Plott, Charles R., Nilanjan, Roy, and Baojia, Tong, “Marshall and Walrus, Disequilibrium Trades and the Dynamics of Equilibration in the Continuous Double Auction Market”. Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization (forthcoming.)
Rassenti, S.J., V. L., Smith, and R. L., Bulfin, (1982). “A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation”, Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2):402–417.Google Scholar

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