Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I A chronological presentation of crisis events January 2007 – December 2014
- Part II Bail-out and/or bail-in of banks in Europe: a country-by-country event study on those European countries which did not receive outside support
- Part III Bail-out and/or bail-in of banks in Europe: a country-by-country event study on those European countries which received IMF/EU support
- Part IV The TARP program and the bailing out (and bailing in) of US banks
- Part V Summary of the micro studies
- Part VI Political and regulatory responses to the crisis: to bail out or to bail in, that's the question
- Conclusion: toward host-country supervision and resolution?
- Addendum
- Bibliography
- Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2016
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I A chronological presentation of crisis events January 2007 – December 2014
- Part II Bail-out and/or bail-in of banks in Europe: a country-by-country event study on those European countries which did not receive outside support
- Part III Bail-out and/or bail-in of banks in Europe: a country-by-country event study on those European countries which received IMF/EU support
- Part IV The TARP program and the bailing out (and bailing in) of US banks
- Part V Summary of the micro studies
- Part VI Political and regulatory responses to the crisis: to bail out or to bail in, that's the question
- Conclusion: toward host-country supervision and resolution?
- Addendum
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As a result of the financial crisis which began in 2007 and was still continuing in 2014, albeit at lower intensity, in countries such as Portugal and Italy, a number of measures have been undertaken to make a repeat of a crisis of a similar magnitude less likely but also to facilitate the recovery and resolution of failing banks should a (systemic) financial crisis nevertheless occur again.
Foremost among measures to increase the resistance of banks to financial stress are the Basel III rules for increasing the quality and quantity of capital as well as the introduction of liquidity coverage ratios, implemented by the Dodd–Frank legislation in the United States and by the CRD IV package in the European Union. Additional measures to improve stability are enhanced supervision, in particular of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, and a focus on stringent stress testing of banks. Countries such as Sweden and Switzerland have gone further than the required minima in setting higher capital requirements, especially for their TBTF banks. Other important measures include increasing the transparency and stability of the OTC derivatives market, forcing most trades to pass through clearing houses and increasing the capital requirements on those that don't. The Dodd–Frank Act places restrictions on the ability by US banks to own hedge and equity funds and forbids banks’ proprietary trading, a half step back to the Glass–Steagall division into banks and investment banks. In Europe, countries such as the UK and France are forcing banks to ring-fence their core activities, especially insured deposit-taking, from riskier investment-bank activities.
Whether the measures taken will be sufficient is hotly debated. Some see the failure to break up the TBTF banks as an indication that the next crisis may be similar to the last one. Others think that the curtailment of banks’ activities will instead lead to a crisis beginning in some part of the less-supervised so-called shadow banking system.
Be that as it may, measures have also been undertaken to change and hopefully improve the manner in which a banking crisis is resolved. In the United States, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) under Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act enhances the powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to seize not only banks but also bank holding companies and other systemically important financial institutions, […]
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- The Future of Financial RegulationWho Should Pay for the Failure of American and European Banks?, pp. xv - xviiiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016