‘The golden towers of the Kremlin, gleaming in the sunlight’: the illusion of Moscow

At the beginning of the month of December the OKH’s large-scale maps (1:1 million) of central-western Russia showed two German panzer groups seemingly poised on the very fringes of Moscow, about to deliver the final coup de grâce. It was, however, a deceptive impression. The offensive strength of Panzer Groups 3 and 4 had almost reached absolute exhaustion, which not only undercut Germans plans for the capture of Moscow, but took no account of their operational manoeuvrability to meet any potential Soviet winter counteroffensive. Indeed, the little remaining reserve strength within Army Group Centre, principally the inactive forces on the right wing of the Fourth Army, were now to be employed to prop up Bock’s stalling attack.

Contrary to a lot of what has been written about the Fourth Army’s role in the battle for Moscow, Kluge was by no means responsible for Army Group Centre’s failed offensive. The idea that Kluge was the great reluctant commander, whose stubborn refusal to join the attack undermined Bock’s whole effort and represents one of the great missed opportunities of Germany’s war in 1941, is simply untenable. The Fourth Army’s weak right wing never came close to making the difference between victory and defeat at Moscow, but that has not saved Kluge from becoming a scapegoat for much more important German deficiencies and weaknesses.