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7 - Orchestrating enforcement

international organizations mobilizing compliance constituencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2015

Jonas Tallberg
Affiliation:
Stockholm University
Kenneth W. Abbott
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
Philipp Genschel
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Duncan Snidal
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Bernhard Zangl
Affiliation:
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munchen
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Summary

Abstract

The most broadly shared conclusion in scholarship on dispute settlement, legalization and compliance over the past two decades is probably the virtue of granting private actors access to international courts and tribunals. Yet for all its benefits, private access is not a universally available and effective institutional design option. This chapter shows that IGOs sometimes compensate for these limits by turning to a strategy of orchestration, and identifies the conditions under which this takes place. Where procedures for private enforcement are lacking, orchestration can offer a substitute, as when IGOs independently create mechanisms for compliance complaints. Where such procedures exist but private actors face resource barriers, orchestration can offer a complement, as when IGOs provide funding and training to potential litigants. This chapter argues that orchestration of enforcement in both its variants will only happen when three necessary conditions are fulfilled: a) IGOs lack sufficient capabilities to effectively enforce compliance through other governance means; b) private actors hold privileged information about state compliance; and c) IGOs enjoy a capacity for independent action, as shaped by entrepreneurial resources and state oversight.

Introduction

The most broadly shared conclusion in scholarship on dispute settlement, legalization and compliance over the past two decades is probably the virtue of granting private actors access to international courts and tribunals (Burley and Mattli 1993; Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Stone Sweet 1999; Keohane et al. 2000; Tallberg 2002a; Raustiala 2004; Alter 2006).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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