Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-pftt2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-30T13:46:24.261Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - The Fear of a Slippery Slope

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2014

Gerald Dworkin
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Chicago
R. G. Frey
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University, Ohio
Sissela Bok
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
R. G. Frey
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University, Ohio
Get access

Summary

In the earlier discussion of PAS and AVE and of valid requests, active/passive euthanasia, and withdrawing/withholding treatment, we indicated why several important arguments intended to show the wrongness of individual acts of PAS failed. The failure of these arguments does not settle the matter of the permissibility of these individual acts of PAS, however, since there remain slippery slope concerns to address. We have reason not to permit even these instances of PAS, if they would indeed lead us down a slippery slope of killing to disastrous consequences.

Especially with regard to taking life, slippery slope arguments have long been a feature of the ethical landscape, used to question the moral permissibility of all kinds of acts, including prominently in recent years abortion and euthanasia. In fact, the very frequency with which such arguments have been deployed can seem almost a point against them. So often has it been predicted that the heavens will fall, that we shall descend the terrible slope of taking life until we reach the Nazi camps (or what strikes adherents of such arguments as the moral equivalent of such camps), that the very fact that the heavens have not fallen and the camps have not reappeared can seem to weaken slippery slope arguments. The situation is not unlike that of a doomsday cult that predicts time and again the end of the world, only for followers to discover the next day that things are pretty much as they were.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×