Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-p2v8j Total loading time: 0.001 Render date: 2024-05-26T02:24:50.076Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - A Depressive Pre–Arab Uprisings Economic Performance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Ali Kadri
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore
Fawaz A. Gerges
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Get access

Summary

This chapter examines the economic vulnerabilities behind the Arab uprisings. The analysis shows that per capita income in the Arab world has stagnated since the early 1980s. The core reasons for this retrogression are successive Arab military defeats, compradorial ruling elites and an imperialist oil grab. Arab states lost autonomy over policy which instead became dictated by the demands of global capital. Economic growth became more heavily dependent on oil rather than on productive investment while conflict and a failure of the state have caused a failure of development and hindered long-term investment. The business cycle in the Arab world is mainly driven by exogenous pressures and represents a case of an ‘imperialistically determined cycle’. Development will continue to fail unless post-uprising governments adopt radical measures that deliver redistribution and land reform.

This essay investigates the determinants of the business cycle in the Arab world (AW) prior to the Arab popular uprisings. As is the case after a military rout, several defeats against Israel and the United States stripped Arab countries of sovereignty and autonomy over policy and subjected the working population to the terms of surrender dictated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB-IMF) policy at the behest of global capital. The social products and assets of the Arab world, including no less the human component, were taken in a manner reminiscent of colonial patterns of capital accumulation. In particular, pursuant to the Camp David accords, which splintered the Arab world, the pattern of economic growth has come to depend more heavily on oil and geopolitical rents, as opposed to the systemic component associated with productive investment. The inverse relationship between political instability and developmental growth became more pronounced with the progress of time. Uncertainty over the time horizon associated with conflict and potential state collapse hampered long-term investment and capital accumulation. This essay contends that the business cycle in the AW is determined by a quasi-colonial relationship underpinned by oil control, and propelled almost in its entirety by political considerations relating to imperialist hegemony.

Type
Chapter
Information
The New Middle East
Protest and Revolution in the Arab World
, pp. 80 - 106
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Foucault, M., Power/Knowledge (New York and Toronto: Pantheon Books, 1980)Google Scholar
Dili Lio, Eugene, ‘The Neoliberal-Developmental State: Singapore as Case-Study’, Critical Sociology, Vol. 38, No. 2, (2011), 241–264Google Scholar
Sala-I-Martin, X. and Artadi, E. V., Economic Growth and Investment in the Arab World (Working Paper; Departament d’Economica i Empresa, Universidad Pompeu Fabra 2002)
El-Erian, M. A., Bisat, A., and Helbling, T., Growth, Investment, and Saving in the Arab Economies, International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2000)
Solow, R. M., ‘A contribution to the theory of economic growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 70, No. 1 (1956), pp. 65–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Romer, P. M., ‘Increasing returns and long-run growth’, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 94, No. 5 (1986), pp. 1002–1037CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lucas, R. E., ‘On the mechanics of economic development’, Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 22, No. 1 (1988), pp. 3–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E., ‘Comparative advantage and long-run growth’, American Economic Review Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990), pp. 796–815Google Scholar
Alesina, A. and Rodrik, D., ‘Distributive politics and economic growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 109, No. 2 (1994), pp. 465–490CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abu-Qarn, Aamer S. and Abu-Bader, Suleiman, ‘Sources of Growth Revisited: Evidence from Selected MENA Countries’, World Development Vol. 35, No. 5(2007), pp. 752–771CrossRefGoogle Scholar
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Macmillan Press, 1998)
Page, J., ‘From Boom to Bust - and Back? The Crisis of Growth in the Middle East and North Africa’, in Shafik, N., ed., Prospects for Middle Eastern and North African Economies – From Boom to Bust and Back? (London: Macmillan Press, 1998) 133–158Google Scholar
Stiglitz, J., ‘We Can Now Cure Dutch Disease’, The Guardian, 18 August 2004
Wrightand, G.Czelusta, J., ‘Why Economies Slow: The Myth of the Resource Curse’, Challenge, Vol. 47, No. (2) 2004, pp. 6–38Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×