Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vsgnj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-18T23:36:19.908Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics

from PART 1 - DEFINING THE FIELD, ITS THEORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND CHANGES AFTER THE COLD WAR

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Jennifer E. Sims
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
Gregory F. Treverton
Affiliation:
RAND Corporation, California
Wilhelm Agrell
Affiliation:
Lunds Universitet, Sweden
Get access

Summary

(T)he standard depiction of the battle of Gettysburg as the accidental collision of two armies marching half blindly…(was) true only for the Confederates. Their 150-mile march from the Rappahannock River to Pennsylvania was penetrated by soldier-spies…Thus General Meade was able to foresee that the enemy would concentrate at or near Gettysburg. His forces seized commanding heights there and surprised the arriving Confederates, who never overcame the Federals' initial advantage of position.

Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union

Intelligence has made a dramatic difference to the outcomes of battles. Yet, scholars have not developed analytical techniques for assessing when intelligence matters in international politics, why it does, or the relative intelligence capabilities of states – a point that Michael Warner makes in Chapter Two. True, several political scientists have written important studies that have put surprise attacks, such as Pearl Harbor and September 11, 2001, in larger perspective. Former intelligence officers have occasionally revealed their experiences in memoirs that suggest the causes of intelligence success and failure. In general, however, the two realms of theory and practice have not talked to one another. Practitioners seem uncomfortable encouraging inquiry in such a sensitive area; academics seem to have few theory-building objectives related to the field; and, with a few notable exceptions, political scientists have shunned intelligence – perhaps in part because they are so unfamiliar with its workings.

Whatever the reason, the lack of scholarly attention to the discipline of intelligence seems odd.

Type
Chapter
Information
National Intelligence Systems
Current Research and Future Prospects
, pp. 58 - 92
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Fishel, Edwin C., The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), p. 1Google Scholar
May, Ernest (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)
Kahn, David, The Code Breakers (New York: Scribner, 1996)Google Scholar
Andrew, Christopher, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995)Google Scholar
Porch, Douglas, The French Secret Services: A History of French Intelligence from the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995)Google Scholar
Warner, Michael, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence,’Studies in Intelligence, 46, 3 (2002): 15–22Google Scholar
Warner, Michael, “The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, 21, 4 (August 2006), 483–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richelson, Jeffrey T., A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar
Feis, William B., Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox (Lincoln, NE, and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002)Google Scholar
West, Nigel, Mask: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain (London and New York: Routledge, 2005)Google Scholar
Rose, Alexander, Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring (New York: Bantam Dell, 2006)Google Scholar
Feis, William B., Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox (Lincoln, NE, and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002)Google Scholar
West, Nigel, Mask: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain (London and New York: Routledge, 2005)Google Scholar
Rose, Alexander, Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring (New York: Bantam Dell, 2006)Google Scholar
Wholstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, June 1962)Google Scholar
Freedman, Lawrence, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, May 1987)Google Scholar
Handel, Michael, War, Politics, and Intelligence (New York: Routledge, 1989)Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar
Godson, Roy, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001)Google Scholar
Zegart, Amy, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar
Herman, Michael, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, Jeffrey R., Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, December 2005)Google Scholar
Treverton, Gregory F., Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/RAND, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, R. V., The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945 (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978)Google Scholar
Masterman, John C., The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972)Google Scholar
Shulsky, Abram, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 2nd edition, revised by Gary Schmitt (New York: Brassey's, 1993)Google Scholar
Heuer, Richards J., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1999)Google Scholar
Lowenthal, Mark, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd edition (Washington: CQ Press, 2006)Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960)Google Scholar
Ambrose, Stephen E. and Sulzberger, C. L., American Heritage New History of World War II (New York: Viking/Penguin) 1997, p. 297Google Scholar
Budiansky, Stephen, Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of Modern Espionage (New York: Viking/Penguin, 2005)Google Scholar
Warner, Michael, “The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, 21, 4 (August 2006): 483–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanami, Andrew K. (ed.), Perspectives on Structural Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. xiiiCrossRef
George, Alexander, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Lauren, Paul G. (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (1979), pp. 43–68Google Scholar
Brown, Bernard E., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 9th edition (New York: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), p. 1Google Scholar
Sims, Jennifer E., “Understanding Friends and Enemies: The Context for American Intelligence Reform,” in Sims, Jennifer E. and Gerber, Burton (eds.), Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 15Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar
Tuchman, Barbara W., The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984)Google Scholar
Baron, Jonathan, Thinking and Deciding, 3rd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000)Google Scholar
Hybel, Alex Roberto, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990)Google Scholar
Ratcliff, R. A., Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, ULTRA, and the End of Secure Ciphers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 113Google Scholar
Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, abridged edition, 1993)Google Scholar
Tarrant, V. E., The Red Orchestra: The Soviet Spy Network Inside Nazi Europe (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1995)Google Scholar
Andrew, Christopher and Mitrokhin, Vasili, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 102Google Scholar
Cooper, Jeffrey, Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, December 2005)Google Scholar
Davis, Jack, “A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence, 38, 5 (1995), 7–15Google Scholar
,Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992)Google Scholar
Richelson, Jeffrey, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar
Taylor, Stan A., “Definitions and Theories of Counterintelligence,” in Johnson, Loch (ed.), Strategic Intelligence: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism, Defending the Nation Against Hostile Forces (Westport, CT: Praeger Security Iternational, 2007), pp. 1–13Google Scholar
Gerber, Burton, Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence (Washington: Georgetown University Press) 2009.Google Scholar
Russell, Kevin, “The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National Security Strategy,” SAIS Review, 24, 1 (Winter/Spring 2004): 147–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gunnell, John G., “The Founding of the American Political Science Association: Discipline, Profession, Political Theory, and Politics,” American Political Science Review, 100, 4, November 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×