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2 - Official and commercial bribery: should they be distinguished?

from Part I - Bribery law: between public wrongdoing and private advantage-taking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2013

By
Stuart P. Green
Edited by
Jeremy Horder  and
Peter Alldridge
Jeremy Horder
Affiliation:
King's College London
Peter Alldridge
Affiliation:
Queen Mary University of London
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Summary

In a recent study of how the public views the blameworthiness of various white collar crime-related activity, my collaborator, Matthew Kugler, and I asked our subjects to compare the acts described in two seemingly similar scenarios. In one scenario:

Jones is ‘a member of the upper house of the State Legislature, where he serves on an important legislative committee that is choosing the site of a major new state office building’. Larson is ‘CEO of a company that owns property adjacent to one of the sites that Jones’ committee is considering’. CEO Larson offers Jones, the legislator, $20,000 in return for Jones’ agreeing to vote for the site, and Jones accepts the offer.

In the other scenario:

Heller is ‘a board-member of a large private corporation . . . currently serving on an important committee within the company that will choose the site of a major new office building that the company plans to build’. Larson is again ‘CEO of a company that owns property adjacent to one of the sites that Heller’s committee is considering’. Larson offers Heller, the company board member, $20,000 if Heller votes for the site Larson favours, and Heller accepts the offer.

Type
Chapter
Information
Modern Bribery Law
Comparative Perspectives
 , pp. 39 - 65
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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References

Klick, J., ‘Performance of Bond Pooling: An Efficiency Argument for Insurance Steering’, unpublished manuscript, 2004)

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