Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-75dct Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-01T06:11:50.454Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Conclusion: ‘unmixing’ Bosnia and Hercegovina

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2015

Cathie Carmichael
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
Get access

Summary

THE IMPACT OF WAR

Exactly 50 years after the apogee of the Independent State of Croatia, the Bosnian Serb Republic created by Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić was at the peak of its territorial extent. The Serbs had pushed through Bosnia expelling, raping and murdering the local populations. By 1993, they controlled approximately 70 per cent of Bosnia and Hercegovina. As a consequence, Mladić was reluctant to sign the Vance–Owen Plan precisely because for him this would have represented territorial rollback. The year 1993 probably represented the peak phase of Serbian nationalism and expansion. In 1995, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to the partition of the state and reluctantly accepted the loss of Sarajevo and its environs as the tide of the war had turned against them. To create greater Serbian or greater Croatian states, both the Ustaša and Bosnian Serbs had committed or attempted to commit genocide. For a historian, the common denominator linking the 1940s to the 1990s is not simply the readiness of some political agents to commit war crimes including mass murder, but also the inherent instability of Bosnia as a state. The root cause of violence was the Serbs' discontent with borders of the successor states. Serbs revived old fascist plans for ethnic cleansing from the Second World War during which Bosnian Muslims had been attacked by Serb nationalists. Undoubtedly distrust of Muslims existed at the level of Serb popular culture as well as a hatred of the Ustaša and Croatian nationalism, but this itself was not the primary cause of the fighting. The war was one of intricate strategy to gain as much territory and people for any future Serbian state(s) as possible and frequently coordinated by nationalists from within Serbia itself. This strategy failed in Kosovo, Krajina and Croatia but worked in Bosnia, where violence was ‘rewarded’ by the Dayton Treaty.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×