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Chapter 22 - Thinking for oneself

from PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA, VOLUME 2

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2015

Adrian Del Caro
Affiliation:
University of Tennessee
Christopher Janaway
Affiliation:
University of Southampton
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Summary

§257

Just as the largest library when not properly arranged does not provide as much use as a very moderate but well arranged one, so the greatest amount of knowledge, if not worked through by one's own thinking, has much less value than a far lesser quantity that has been thought through in various ways. For only through the universal combination of what we know, and comparing every truth with every other, do we completely assimilate our own knowledge and take control of it. One can only think through what one knows, which is why we should learn something; but one also knows only what has been thought through.

Now we can always apply ourselves arbitrarily to reading and learning, whereas to thinking we really cannot. For thinking must be kindled and sustained like a fire by a draught of air; there must be some interest in its subject, which may be purely objective or merely subjective. The latter is only present in our personal affairs, but the former is only for those minds who think by nature, for whom thinking is as natural as breathing, but who are very rare. Therefore in most scholars there is so little of it.

§258

The difference between the effect that thinking for oneself has on the mind, versus that of reading is incredibly large, which is why it constantly magnifies the original difference between minds, by virtue of which we are driven to one or the other. Reading, that is, forces thoughts on the mind that are as foreign and heterogeneous to its momentary direction and mood as is the seal to the wax on which it presses its imprint. The mind here experiences a total external compulsion to think this or that at random, for which it simply has no inclination or mood. – On the other hand, with thinking for oneself it follows its own peculiar drive, as this for the moment was more specifically determined by either the external environment or some recollection. For the intuitive environment does not force one specific thought on the mind, like reading; instead, it provides the mind with material and occasion to think what is in accordance with its nature and present mood.

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Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena
Short Philosophical Essays
, pp. 441 - 449
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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