In the three weeks since Sarajevo, the Habsburg leadership had kept the other Powers guessing as to how Austria-Hungary was likely to react to the assassination of the Archduke. In their different ways Jagow, Grey, Poincaré and Sazonov had indicated their respective positions in anticipation of international complications. Jagow had affirmed the ‘blank cheque’, committing Berlin to unconditional support of its Austro-Hungarian ally without retaining any means of controlling, let alone restraining, its actions. Grey had correctly identified Germany and Russia as key to preventing the further escalation of the Austro-Serbian crisis, but had – again correctly – confined himself to encouraging Berlin and St Petersburg to exchange views on the situation in the Balkans. As for the Franco-Russian allies, the French president had sought to stiffen what he considered to be Russia’s flaccid stance in the face of a likely Austro-Hungarian move against Serbia. Sazonov, meanwhile, plagued as much by doubts about the correct policy response to the crisis as by his suspicions of Habsburg policy, had failed to communicate a consistent line to the other Powers, most significantly Austria-Hungary and Germany. Until Vienna revealed its hand, however, there was little more that any of the other chancelleries of Europe could do.