The Other Saudis has shown that the study of communal politics and sectarianism needs to take a historical approach that gives people involved in communal politics agency. The prominence of sectarian identities in the Middle East is related to the nature of modern state building in the region, which often relied on cultural groups as key constituencies – be they ethnic, tribal or religious – and which is characterised by a strong centralisation of power. In addition, many of these states, and particularly those in the Gulf, did not have a strong sense of unity. They did not try to foster such a sense of belonging amongst their citizens, at least not in earnest, until the late twentieth century. This is not to say that nationalism is a particularly desirable phenomenon, or that it needs to be at odds with strong sectarian identities. But the absence of a strong inclusive nationalism, and in the Saudi case the emphasis on a religious nationalism that per se excludes the Shia, helps to explain the prominence of other collective identities. Until the mid-twentieth century, it would be difficult to speak of Saudi national identities, and those who were advocating Arab nationalism, including some of the leftist activists in the Eastern Province, were punished severely. While the leftists sought to overcome sectarian and religious identities, their defeat facilitated the emergence of Islamism. At the periphery of the country and as the preferred Other of Saudi religious nationalism, Shia then sought refuge in their sectarian identities.

The alliance of local elites with a state that is fundamentally suspicious of Shia Muslims set the stage for competition amongst local elites and political groups, a condition that played into the hands of those who divide and rule. Essentially, Shia elites have tried for a century to deliver to their constituencies what the state never wanted to give them. And the state has been quite skilful at fostering infighting amongst various political strands – notables, leftists, Islamists. The development of strong Islamist movements – both Shia and Sunni – since the 1970s made sectarianism more salient. If Islam becomes the main reference point for political activism, then the question of which sect one belongs to inevitably becomes more salient.