The point of departure for this book was a paradox. Recent years have witnessed a steep increase around the world in the magnitude, frequency and geographical spread of megaprojects, namely multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects such as airports, high-speed rail, urban rail, tunnels, bridges, ports, motorways, dams, power plants, water projects, oil and gas extraction projects, information and telecommunications technology systems, and so on. Never in the history of humankind have we built more, or more expensive, infrastructure projects. And never have such projects been more central to establishing what sociologist Zygmunt Bauman calls ‘independence from space’ and Microsoft chair Bill Gates ‘frictionless capitalism’. Yet when actual versus predicted performance of megaprojects are compared, the picture is often dismal. We have documented in this book that:

1. • Cost overruns of 50 per cent to 100 per cent in real terms are common in megaprojects; overruns above 100 per cent are not uncommon;

2. • Demand forecasts that are wrong by 20 per cent to 70 per cent compared with actual developments are common;

3. • The extent and magnitude of actual environmental impacts of projects are often very different from forecast impacts. Post-auditing is neglected;

4. • The substantial regional, national and sometimes international development effects commonly claimed by project promoters typically do not materialise, or they are so diffuse that researchers cannot detect them;

5. • Actual project viability typically does not correspond with forecast viability, the latter often being brazenly over-optimistic.