Between Genetic Structuralism and Phenomenology: The Complex Constitution of Habitus

For nearly thirty years now, the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu has been used in an increasingly large number of studies in the social sciences. It is remarkable, however, that it has had a rather weak impact on my own field of research: the study of new social movements. This chapter argues that the reason for this anomaly lies with Bourdieu's theory of habitus (a central element of Bourdieusian thought) and the particular problems that this theory poses for researchers of new social movements. As original and powerful as it can be, the theory of habitus is, first and foremost, a theory of reproduction and determination. As such, its ability to help us to understand the creativity and radical innovations of the actors who constitute new social movements is severely limited. Thus, whilst immersed in my own research, I found that I had to choose between two options: one option was to abandon the Bourdieusian approach to the social all together; the other option was to stay within the Bourdieusian paradigm and, in the light of its substantial shortcomings, seek to transcend its limitations. Preferring to pursue the latter – somewhat more optimistic – project, the question to be confronted was whether or not it is possible to move Bourdieu's paradigm forward, beyond its conventional applications, in order to render it operational in other areas, such as my own, where it is has not contributed a great deal.