Constructivism in political theory is opposed to both scepticism and foundationalism. Against the sceptic the constructivist hopes to defend the objectivity of at least some political principles. Against the foundationalist the constructivist hopes to show that the defence of objectivity need not appeal to any account of the necessary and unchanging foundations for moral reasoning. Evil has traditionally been seen in foundationalist terms, as a theological concept depending on the existence of God or as depending on some alternative scheme of absolute moral judgement, in order to mark out a special sort of wrongness. When these foundations have been challenged by sceptical attack the idea of evil has seemed deprived of its sense. Many contemporary accounts seek to ‘debunk’ evil, to relativise it or to recast it as just a tool in the armoury of politicians. Given constructivism's non-foundationalism, must it be similarly sceptical towards evil, or can a place for the notion of evil be found in constructivist theories?

After briefly laying out several contemporary sceptical positions that are keen to see evil in purely political and instrumental terms, this chapter will argue that evil can play three distinct roles in constructivist accounts and in doing so will defend an understanding of evil that goes well beyond the instrumental. Constructivism can make space for:

1. Judgements of evil: constructivist accounts of political morality get off the ground by reference to what are regarded as paradigmatic instances of moral reasoning. Our specific judgements about what constitutes evil can play this role.

2. Conceptions of evil: constructivist accounts of political morality aim to identify principles of justice that should be regarded as especially weighty. Various conceptions of evil can be regarded as making claims about the content of such principles of justice.

3. The concept of evil: central to the idea of evil is the idea of the distinctly wrong, different in character from other wrongs. This notion of a ‘threshold’ within wrongness marks an important distinction for political constructivism. The idea of such a threshold makes possible the idea of a thin universalism that is important to plausible notions of political constructivism.