Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword: Sorting Out Our National Liability Crisis by Richard A. Epstein
- Acknowledgments
- LAWYER BARONS
- Introduction
- 1 The Origin of the Contingency Fee
- 2 How Profitable Are Contingency Fees?
- 3 Are Contingency Fee Profits “Reasonable”?
- 4 How Tort Lawyers Have Increased Their Profits by Restraining Competition
- 5 Why the Market Has Failed to Correct the Absence of Price Competition
- 6 Impediments Imposed by the Bar to Price Competition
- 7 The Effects of Incentives Created by Contingency Fees
- 8 How the Quest for Profits Influenced the Development of the Tort System
- 9 Lawyers' Role in the Expansion of Tort Liability
- 10 The Role of the Judiciary in Tort System Expansion
- 11 Current and Future Expansions of Tort Liability
- 12 The “Litigation Explosion”
- 13 Measures of the Rate of Expansion of Tort Liability
- 14 The Relationship between Injury Rates and Tort System Costs
- 15 The Impacts of Substantial Increases in Tort Lawyers' Effective Hourly Rates
- 16 Class Actions
- 17 Fees in Class Actions
- 18 How Class Action Lawyers Game Fee Setting
- 19 Securities Class Actions
- 20 Regulation through Litigation
- 21 A New Role for Punitive Damages
- 22 For-Profit Partnerships between State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Lawyers
- Conclusion
- Appendix A A Critique of Alex Tabarrok
- Appendix B Calculating Tort Lawyers' Effective Hourly Rates in 1960
- Appendix C Electronic Discovery and the Use of Contract Lawyers
- Appendix D The HMO Litigation
- Appendix E The GM “Side Saddle” Truck Litigation
- Appendix F Modern Class Actions Undermine Democratic Precepts
- Appendix G Other Ways Lawyers Game Class Action Fees
- Appendix H Nonrecourse Financing of Tort Litigation
- Appendix I Political Contributions by Tort Lawyers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- Appendix J Special Rules Favoring Lawyers
- Appendix K The Ultimate Medical Expense “Buildup”: Whiplash
- Appendix L The Effect of Punitive Damages on Compensatory Awards
- Index
Appendix K - The Ultimate Medical Expense “Buildup”: Whiplash
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword: Sorting Out Our National Liability Crisis by Richard A. Epstein
- Acknowledgments
- LAWYER BARONS
- Introduction
- 1 The Origin of the Contingency Fee
- 2 How Profitable Are Contingency Fees?
- 3 Are Contingency Fee Profits “Reasonable”?
- 4 How Tort Lawyers Have Increased Their Profits by Restraining Competition
- 5 Why the Market Has Failed to Correct the Absence of Price Competition
- 6 Impediments Imposed by the Bar to Price Competition
- 7 The Effects of Incentives Created by Contingency Fees
- 8 How the Quest for Profits Influenced the Development of the Tort System
- 9 Lawyers' Role in the Expansion of Tort Liability
- 10 The Role of the Judiciary in Tort System Expansion
- 11 Current and Future Expansions of Tort Liability
- 12 The “Litigation Explosion”
- 13 Measures of the Rate of Expansion of Tort Liability
- 14 The Relationship between Injury Rates and Tort System Costs
- 15 The Impacts of Substantial Increases in Tort Lawyers' Effective Hourly Rates
- 16 Class Actions
- 17 Fees in Class Actions
- 18 How Class Action Lawyers Game Fee Setting
- 19 Securities Class Actions
- 20 Regulation through Litigation
- 21 A New Role for Punitive Damages
- 22 For-Profit Partnerships between State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Lawyers
- Conclusion
- Appendix A A Critique of Alex Tabarrok
- Appendix B Calculating Tort Lawyers' Effective Hourly Rates in 1960
- Appendix C Electronic Discovery and the Use of Contract Lawyers
- Appendix D The HMO Litigation
- Appendix E The GM “Side Saddle” Truck Litigation
- Appendix F Modern Class Actions Undermine Democratic Precepts
- Appendix G Other Ways Lawyers Game Class Action Fees
- Appendix H Nonrecourse Financing of Tort Litigation
- Appendix I Political Contributions by Tort Lawyers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- Appendix J Special Rules Favoring Lawyers
- Appendix K The Ultimate Medical Expense “Buildup”: Whiplash
- Appendix L The Effect of Punitive Damages on Compensatory Awards
- Index
Summary
Soft-tissue injuries account for a majority of the bodily injury claims generated by auto accidents. This is especially the case in bodily injury claims in urban areas. Soft-tissue injuries cannot be detected by X-rays or MRI scans and are diagnosed solely on the basis of the symptoms reported by the injured person.
The most common soft-tissue injury claimed by auto accident victims is chronic whiplash. A whiplash injury is defined as “an injury to the cervical spine resulting from acceleration and hyperextension of the head during a motor vehicle accident.” The diagnosis of whiplash is made primarily on the basis of subjectively reported symptoms, such as neck pain, headache, back pain, concentration, and memory difficulties, and the absence of similar pre-existing complaints. Ten years ago, it was estimated that more than $29 billion was spent annually in the United States on whiplash injuries and litigation. Today, that amount is undoubtedly higher.
A study conducted in Lithuania attempted to determine whether chronic whiplash was a medical event or simply a reflection of the compensation system. (Lithuania was chosen because, at the time of the study, there was no financial incentive for Lithuanians to claim chronic injuries; because few automobile drivers were covered by personal-injury insurance, most medical bills were paid by the government and lawsuits were rare.) The study compared injury complaints reported by 202 individuals from Kaunas, Lithuania, who had experienced rear-end collisions with injury complaints reported by a control group of 202 individuals from the same region, who had not been involved in an automobile collision.
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- Information
- Lawyer BaronsWhat Their Contingency Fees Really Cost America, pp. 541 - 544Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011