Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-cjp7w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-02T21:35:24.125Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Economics versus Psychology Experiments

Stylization, Incentives, and Deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Eric S. Dickson
Affiliation:
New York University
James N. Druckman
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
Donald P. Greene
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
James H. Kuklinski
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Arthur Lupia
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Get access

Summary

In this chapter, I follow other authors (e.g., Kagel and Roth 1995; McDermott 2002; Camerer 2003; Morton and Williams 2010) in focusing on a few key dimensions of difference between experiments in the economic and psychological traditions.

Section 1 considers the level of stylization typical in economics and psychology experimentation. Although research in the political psychology tradition tends to place an emphasis on the descriptive realism of laboratory scenarios, work in experimental economics tends to proceed within a purposefully abstract, “context free” environment.

Section 2 considers the kinds of incentives offered to subjects by experimentalists from these two schools of thought. Experimental economists generally offer subjects monetary incentives that depend on subjects' choices in the laboratory – and, in game-theoretic experiments, the choices of other subjects as well. In contrast, psychology research tends not to offer inducements that are conditional on subjects' actions, instead giving subjects fixed cash payments or fixed amounts of course credit.

Section 3 considers the use of deception. The psychological school tends to see deception as a useful tool in experimentation, and, at times, a necessary one. In contrast, the economic school by and large considers deception to be taboo.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bassi, Anna, Morton, Rebecca, and Williams, Kenneth. 2007. “The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting.” Paper presented at the Political Economy Seminar Series, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. Retrieved from www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/documents/morton0502072.pdf (October 30, 2010).
Bonetti, Shane. 1998. “Experimental Economics and Deception.” Journal of Economic Psychology 19: 377–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bortolotti, Lisa, and Mameli, Matteo. 2006. “Deception in Psychology: Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge.” Accountability in Research 13: 259–75.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Brader, Ted. 2005. “Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions.” American Journal of Political Science 49: 388–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., and Hogarth, Robin M.. 1999. “The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19: 7–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Yan, and Li, Sherry Xin. 2009. “Group Identity and Social Preferences.” American Economic Review 99: 431–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dickson, Eric S. in press. “Leadership, Followership, and Beliefs about the World: An Experiment.” British Journal of Political Science.
Dickson, Eric S., Hafer, Catherine, and Landa, Dimitri. 2008. “Cognition and Strategy: A Deliberation Experiment.” Journal of Politics 70: 974–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Druckman, James N., and Nelson, Kjersten R.. 2003. “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence.” American Journal of Political Science 47: 729–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, Ernst, and Gächter, Simon. 2000. “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review 90: 980–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gneezy, Uri, and Rustichini, Aldo. 2000. “Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 791–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griggs, Richard A., and Cox, James R.. 1982. “The Elusive Thematics Material Effect in Wason's Selection Task.” British Journal of Psychology 73: 407–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hey, John D. 1991. Experiments in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Hey, John D. 1998. “Experimental Economics and Deception: A Comment.” Journal of Economic Psychology 19: 397–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jamison, Julian, Karlan, Dean, and Schechter, Laura. 2008. “To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior in Future Laboratory Experiments.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68: 477–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagel, John H., and Roth, Alvin E.. 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ledyard, John O. 1995. “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. Kagel, John H. and Roth, Alvin E.. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 111–94.Google Scholar
Levine, David K., and Palfrey, Thomas R.. 2007. “The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study.” American Political Science Review 101: 143–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lupia, Arthur, and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2002. “Experimental Methodology in Political Science.” Political Analysis 10: 325–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Morton, Rebecca B., and Williams, Kenneth C.. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prior, Markus, and Lupia, Arthur. 2008. “Money, Time, and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Quick Recall and Political Learning Skills.” American Journal of Political Science 52: 169–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tajfel, Henri, Billig, Michael, Bundy, R., and Flament, Claude L.. 1971. “Social Categorization and Inter-Group Behavior.” European Journal of Social Psychology 1: 149–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tajfel, Henri, and Turner, John. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, eds. Worchel, Stephen and Austin, William G.. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.Google Scholar
Titmuss, Richard M. 1970. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. London: George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Wason, P. C. 1968. “Reasoning about a Rule.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 20: 273–81.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×