The credible constraints framework helps explain India's growth performance, and finds confirmation in cross-national statistical patterns as well. The principal claim is that constraints on arbitrary and capricious policymaking enhances policy stability which engenders greater confidence on the part of economic actors. In particular, coalition governments in parliamentary systems have been identified as especially useful for providing such “credible constraints.” The central mechanisms in generating the status quo bias in policymaking that leads to favorable economic outcomes have been two: first, coalitions require compromise among members of the ruling coalition to obtain the support required for successful legislation, and, second, the process of government formation privileges centrist parties as potential government formateurs (Strøm 1990; Strøm and Müller 1999).

In this chapter, I analyze the growth experiences of four countries to illustrate better the logic of the theoretical argument. The emphasis in each – admittedly cursory – case study is to understand the within-country experience with the dynamics of coalition politics and their effects on national economic performance. Therefore, the purpose is not to compare across cases since more factors affecting volatility and growth exist than can be controlled. That after all was the purpose of the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 since regression is an ideal tool for providing just such control. But the limits of statistics are just as clear in their inability to illuminate the mechanisms at work in producing the varied outcomes that form our dependent variables.