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11 - Philosophical assumptions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Alec Fisher
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
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Summary

The method of argument analysis which is developed in this book is distinctive in employing the Assertibility Question. We introduced it in Chapter 2, we explained how to use it and we have illustrated how it works in several examples, but since it underlies our whole approach we must now attempt to answer some questions which may be raised about it. We shall first remind ourselves of our objectives and of how the Assertibility Question functions in attempting to realise those. We shall then explain some ideas about meaning which lie behind our method. We then provide a brief reply to the general challenge of scepticism and finally we explain why we attach relatively little importance to the notion of deductive validity in this whole exercise.

Objectives

Our objective is to describe and demonstrate a systematic method for extracting an argument from its written context and for evaluating it. We want a method which will apply to a wide range of both everyday and theoretical arguments and which will work for ordinary reasoning as expressed in natural language (and not just for those made-up examples with which logicians usually deal). We also want a method which draws on the insights and lessons of classical logic where these are helpful, but which is non-formal and reasonably efficient (both requirements exclude a method which requires us to translate real arguments into the symbolism of classical logic).

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Chapter
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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  • Philosophical assumptions
  • Alec Fisher, University of East Anglia
  • Book: The Logic of Real Arguments
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818455.013
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  • Philosophical assumptions
  • Alec Fisher, University of East Anglia
  • Book: The Logic of Real Arguments
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818455.013
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Philosophical assumptions
  • Alec Fisher, University of East Anglia
  • Book: The Logic of Real Arguments
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818455.013
Available formats
×