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- Putting Auction Theory to Work , pp. 339 - 346Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004
References
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(2001). “Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information.” Econometrica 69(4): 861–890CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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and (2001). “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” Rand Journal of Economics 32(3): 428–465CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Athey, Susan, Kyle Bagwell and Chris Sanchirico (2003). “Collusion and Price Rigidity.” Review of Economic Studies (Forthcoming)
Ausubel, Lawrence and Peter Cramton (2002). “Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions.” www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995–1999/98wp-demand-reduction.pdf
Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Jesse A. Schwartz (1999). “The Ascending Auction Paradox.” http://www.market-design.com/files/ausubel-schwartz-ascending-auction-paradox.pdf
Ausubel, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom (2001). “System and Method for a Dynamic Auction with Package Bidding.” Patent Application Treaty application
Ausubel, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom (2002). “Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding.” Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 1 (1): Article 1
(1998). “Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions.” Review of Economic Studies 65(2, No. 223): 185–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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, , and (2002). “Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions.” Games and Economic Behavior 38: 19–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Cantillon, Estelle and Martin Pesendorfer (2003). “Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions.” Working paper
Cassady, Ralph (1967). Auctions and Auctioneering, Berkeley, University of California Press
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, and (1983). “Competitive Bidding with Proprietary Information.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 11: 161–169CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , and (2002). “A Combinational Auction Improves School Meals in Chile.” Interfaces 32(6): 1–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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, , and (1967). “Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV: Games with Unknown Costs.” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14(4): 415–433CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Hohner, Gail, John Rich, Ed Ng, Grant Reed, Andrew Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam, Ho Soo Lee and Chae An (2002). “Combinatorial and Quantity Discount Procurement Auctions with Mutual Benefits at Mars, Incorporated.” IBM Watson Labs Research Center Working Paper
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and (1991). “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?” American Economic Review 81(5):1170–1188Google Scholar
and (1992). “Coordination in Split Award Auctions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics ⅭVII: 681–707CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1989). “How Auctions Work for Wine and Art.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 23–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ashenfelter, Orley and Kathryn Graddy (2002). “Art Auctions: A Survey of Empirical Studies.” Center for Economic Policy Studies
(2001). “Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information.” Econometrica 69(4): 861–890CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002). “Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1): 187–223CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (2001). “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” Rand Journal of Economics 32(3): 428–465CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Athey, Susan, Kyle Bagwell and Chris Sanchirico (2003). “Collusion and Price Rigidity.” Review of Economic Studies (Forthcoming)
Ausubel, Lawrence and Peter Cramton (2002). “Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions.” www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995–1999/98wp-demand-reduction.pdf
Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Jesse A. Schwartz (1999). “The Ascending Auction Paradox.” http://www.market-design.com/files/ausubel-schwartz-ascending-auction-paradox.pdf
Ausubel, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom (2001). “System and Method for a Dynamic Auction with Package Bidding.” Patent Application Treaty application
Ausubel, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom (2002). “Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding.” Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 1 (1): Article 1
(1998). “Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions.” Review of Economic Studies 65(2, No. 223): 185–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1996). “Deficit Reduction through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the Fcc Increased Auction Competition.” Stanford Law Review 48(4): 761–815CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1993). “Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment.” Review of Financial Studies 6(4): 733–764CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (2001). “Incentives Versus Transactions Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts.” Rand Journal of Economics 32(3): 387–407CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1989). “Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach.” Rand Journal of Economics 20: 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (2002). “Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design.” Econometrica 70(3): 1007–1033CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1986). “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101: 1–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1883). “Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Sociale.” Journal des Sawarts 69: 499–508Google Scholar
, , and (2002). “Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions.” Games and Economic Behavior 38: 19–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Board, Simon (2002). “Bidding into the Red.” Stanford GSB Working Paper
and (1996). “A Binary Conflict Ascending Price (Bicap) Mechanism for the Decentralized Allocation of the Right to Use Railroad Tracks.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 14: 857–886CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1999). “Toeholds and Takeovers.” Journal of Political Economy 107(3): 427–454CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1989). “The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions.” Journal of Political Economy 97(5): 1060–1090CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cantillon, Estelle and Martin Pesendorfer (2002). “Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions.” http://www.people.hbs.edu/ecantillon/combinationJuly2002.pdf
Cantillon, Estelle and Martin Pesendorfer (2003). “Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions.” Working paper
Cassady, Ralph (1967). Auctions and Auctioneering, Berkeley, University of California Press
Cassady, Ralph (1967). Auctions and Auctioneering. Berkeley: University of California Press
(1993). “Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions.” Rand Journal of Economics 24(4): 668–680CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1998). “Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders.” Review of Economic Studies 65(1, No. 222): 1–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1959). “The Federal Communications Commission.” Journal of Law and Economics 2: 1–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cramton, Peter, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Brad Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent and Robert Wilson (1997). “Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions.” Report 1a: Market Design, Inc and Charles River Associates, www.market-design.com/files/97cra-auction-design-enhancements-for-non-combinatorial-auctions.pdf
and (2001). “Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the Fcc Spectrum Auctions.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 17: 229–252CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1985). “Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Independent.” Econometrica 53(2): 345–361CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cybernomics (2000). “An Experimental Comparison of the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction and the Cra Combinatorial Auction.” http://wireless.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions/comin/98540191.pdf
and (1994). “Designing a Private Industry.” Journal of Public Economics 53: 127–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1998a). “Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics.” Journal of Economic Theory 81: 201–219CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1998b). “Strict Single Crossing and the Strict Spence-Mirrlees Condition: A Comment on Monotone Comparative Statics.” Econometrica 60(6): 1417–1425CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1998). “Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices.” Economic Theory 12: 227–258CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1983). “Competitive Bidding with Proprietary Information.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 11: 161–169CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , , and (2002). “A Combinational Auction Improves School Meals in Chile.” Interfaces 32(6): 1–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, MIT Press
Goeree, Jacob and Theo Offerman (2002). “The Amsterdam Auction.” http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpmi/0205002.html
and (1987). “Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object, Second-Price and English Auctions.” Journal of Political Economy 95: 1217–1239CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1977). “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods.” Econometrica 45: 427–438CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and (1967). “Toward a Study of Bidding Processes Part IV: Games with Unknown Costs.” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14(4): 415–433CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1981). “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality.” Journal of Law and Economics: 24(3:) 461–483CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1999). “Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes.” Journal of Economic Theory 87(1): 9–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (2000). “The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities.” Journal of Economic Theory 92(1): 66–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1988). “Auctions with Endogenous Quantity.” Rand Journal of Economics 19(1): 44–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1967–68). “Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players (Parts I-III).” Management Science 14: 159–182, 320–334, 486–502CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). “Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did Fcc License Auctions Take 67 Years?” Journal of Law and Economics XⅬI(2, pt 2): 529–575CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1994). “Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price.” Econometrica 63(1): 1–27Google Scholar
Hernando-Veciana, Angel (2003). “Successful Uninformed Bidding.” Games and Economic Behavior (Forthcoming)
Hohner, Gail, John Rich, Ed Ng, Grant Reed, Andrew Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam, Ho Soo Lee and Chae An (2002). “Combinatorial and Quantity Discount Procurement Auctions with Mutual Benefits at Mars, Incorporated.” IBM Watson Labs Research Center Working Paper
Hohner, Gail, John Rich, Ed Ng, Grant Reid, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant R. Kalagnanam, Ho Soo Lee and Chae An (2001). “Combinatorial and Quantity Discount Procurement Auctions with Mutual Benefits at Mars, Incorporated.” IBM-Mars Report
and (1987). “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives.” Econometrica 55(2): 303–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1973). “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation.” American Economic Review 63(2): 1–30Google Scholar
and (2001). “Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations.” Econometrica 69(5): 1237–1259CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1996). “How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons.” American Economic Review 86: 814–829Google Scholar
Kagel, John H and Dan Levin (2002). Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse. Princeton, Princeton University Press
Kagel, John H. (1995). “Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research.” The Handbook of Experimental Economics. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Chapter 7: 501–585
and (1982). “Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes.” Econometrica 50: 1483CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1998). “Auctions with Almost Common Values: The Wallet Game and Its Applications.” European Economic Review 42: 757–769CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(2002a). “What Really Matters in Auction Design.” Journal of Economics Perspectives 16(1): 169–190CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klemperer, Paul (2002b). “Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory.” http://www.paulklemperer.org/
and (1989). “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty.” Econometrica 57(6): 1243–1277CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kwerel, Evan and Alex Felker (1985). “Using Auctions to Select Fcc Licensees,” Washington: Federal Communications Commission: 32
(1997). “Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data.” European Economic Review 41: 1–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1980). “A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms.” Econometrica 48: 1507–1520CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1995). “Econometrics of First-Price Auctions.” Econometrica 63(4): 953–980CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and (1997). “Experiments Testing Multi-Object Allocation Mechanisms.” Journal of Economics Perspectives 6: 639–675Google Scholar
, and (2002). “Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions.” Journal of the ACM 49(5): 577–602CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and (1994). “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry.” American Economic Review 84(3): 585–599Google Scholar
Mas Colell, Andreu, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory. New York, Oxford University Press
Maskin, Eric (1992). “Auctions and Privatisation.” Privatisation. H. Siebert: 115–136
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