Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 What Is Intentionality, and Why Is It Important?
- 2 Perception of a Cube as a Paradigm of Conscious Experience
- 3 Three Formal Structures in Phenomenology
- 4 An Initial Statement of What Phenomenology Is
- 5 Perception, Memory, and Imagination
- 6 Words, Pictures, and Symbols
- 7 Categorial Intentions and Objects
- 8 Phenomenology of the Self
- 9 Temporality
- 10 The Life World and Intersubjectivity
- 11 Reason, Truth, and Evidence
- 12 Eidetic Intuition
- 13 Phenomenology Defined
- 14 Phenomenology in the Present Historical Context
- Appendix: Phenomenology in the Last One Hundred Years
- Select Bibliography
- Index
1 - What Is Intentionality, and Why Is It Important?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 What Is Intentionality, and Why Is It Important?
- 2 Perception of a Cube as a Paradigm of Conscious Experience
- 3 Three Formal Structures in Phenomenology
- 4 An Initial Statement of What Phenomenology Is
- 5 Perception, Memory, and Imagination
- 6 Words, Pictures, and Symbols
- 7 Categorial Intentions and Objects
- 8 Phenomenology of the Self
- 9 Temporality
- 10 The Life World and Intersubjectivity
- 11 Reason, Truth, and Evidence
- 12 Eidetic Intuition
- 13 Phenomenology Defined
- 14 Phenomenology in the Present Historical Context
- Appendix: Phenomenology in the Last One Hundred Years
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The term most closely associated with phenomenology is “intentionality.” The core doctrine in phenomenology is the teaching that every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional: it is essentially “consciousness of” or an “experience of” something or other. All our awareness is directed toward objects. If I see, I see some visual object, such as a tree or a lake; if I imagine, my imagining presents an imaginary object, such as a car that I visualize coming down a road; if I am involved in remembering, I remember a past object; if I am engaged in judging, I intend a state of affairs or a fact. Every act of consciousness, every experience, is correlated with an object. Every intending has its intended object.
We should note that this sense of “intend” or “intention” should not be confused with “intention” as the purpose we have in mind when we act (“He bought some wood with the intention of building a shed”; “She intended to finish law school a year later”). The phenomenological notion of intentionality applies primarily to the theory of knowledge, not to the theory of human action. The phenomenological use of the word is somewhat awkward because it goes against ordinary usage, which tends to use “intention” in the practical sense; the phenomenological use will almost always call up the sense of practical intending as an overtone. However, “intentionality” and its cognates have become technical terms in phenomenology, and there is no way of avoiding them in a discussion of this philosophical tradition.
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- Information
- Introduction to Phenomenology , pp. 8 - 16Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999