Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-5g6vh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-27T12:59:33.528Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2015

Massimo Motta
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

As we have seen, the concept of market power is central to competition policy. So far, we have dealt with this concept from a theoretical point of view. This chapter introduces the reader to the issue of how market power should be assessed in practice. Many competition law investigations will start with such an assessment.

Ideally, one would like to estimate directly the extent to which a firm has (or increases its) market power. In merger cases, for instance, one might want to understand whether the merging firms will be able to profitably raise prices above the current level. Some modern econometric techniques (briefly analysed in the technical Section 3.3.2) allow us to do precisely that.

However, in many circumstances these econometric exercises are not feasible for lack of reliable data, and even when they are feasible, it might be a good idea to complement their results with the more traditional approach that evaluates the market power of firms by analysing the market in which they operate. In turn, this requires defining the “relevant market”, that is the set of products and geographical areas to which the products of the merging firms belong. It is such a set of products (and areas) that might create competitive constraints to the firms under analysis.

In this perspective, the definition of the market (both from its product and geographical points of view) is a preliminary step towards the assessment of market power.

In this chapter, I first discuss how to define a market (Section 3.2) and then how to assess market power (Section 3.3) so as to mimic the sequence that cases often follow in many anti-trust jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it should be stressed first that market definition is not of interest by itself, but only as a preliminary step towards the objective of assessing market power.

Type
Chapter
Information
Competition Policy
Theory and Practice
, pp. 101 - 136
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×